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Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America Kindle Edition
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A sobering and fascinating study on war in the modern era, Unrestricted Warfare carefully explores strategies that militarily and politically disadvantaged nations might take in order to successfully attack a geopolitical super-power like the United States. American military doctrine is typically led by technology; a new class of weapon or vehicle is developed, which allows or encourages an adjustment in strategy. Military strategists Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui argue that this dynamic is a crucial weakness in the American military, and that this blind spot with regard to alternative forms warfare could be effectively exploited by enemies. Unrestricted Warfare concerns the many ways in which this might occur, and, in turn, suggests what the United States might do to defend itself.
The traditional mentality that offensive action is limited to military action is no longer adequate given the range of contemporary threats and the rising costs-both in dollars and lives lost-of traditional warfare. Instead, Liang and Xiangsui suggest the significance of alternatives to direct military confrontation, including international policy, economic warfare, attacks on digital infrastructure and networks, and terrorism. Even a relatively insignificant state can incapacitate a far more powerful enemy by applying pressure to their economic and political systems. Exploring each of these considerations with remarkable insight and clarity, Unrestricted Warfare is an engaging evaluation of our geopolitical future.
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherU.S. Dep. of Health
- Publication dateMarch 8, 2021
- File size304 KB
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Editorial Reviews
Review
Unrestricted Warfare is evidence linking China to 9/11. It is also their plan for global operations against America. -- Wilson C. Lucom, End War, August 2002
You need to read Unrestricted Warfare because it reveals China's game plan in its coming war with America. -- Admiral Thomas Moorer (USN/ret.), August 2002 --This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.
Product details
- ASIN : B08YN9FGGK
- Publisher : U.S. Dep. of Health; 1st edition (March 8, 2021)
- Publication date : March 8, 2021
- Language : English
- File size : 304 KB
- Text-to-Speech : Enabled
- Screen Reader : Supported
- Enhanced typesetting : Enabled
- X-Ray : Not Enabled
- Word Wise : Enabled
- Sticky notes : On Kindle Scribe
- Print length : 236 pages
- Page numbers source ISBN : 7872256606
- Best Sellers Rank: #912,655 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #425 in Terrorism (Kindle Store)
- #1,424 in Terrorism (Books)
- #10,943 in Military History (Kindle Store)
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However, the topic is strategy. The words used can be relatively confusing at times, not quite embodying the meaning given to them by the authors. Unlimited...but within limits. Unrestricted...but following rules. It can be a bit of a struggle to follow their train of thought and understand their meaning (especially with the writing style, which lacks clarity or organization). Despite this I think it is worth struggling with, and especially with a broad overview of some of the argument to assist. Such a board overview follows.
The main point: the United States is prone to think in a manner which intrinsically restricts the conduct of warfare to only a formal military domain; thus it abstracts military action from its location in social domains (politics, economy, information, etc). This fits rather well. We like things to be formulas or mechanistic. We also like to abstract them away into separate ("rigidly distinct") boxes which have no interaction. And so, the military is responsible for military problems and better stay far from anything approaching politics! However, as the authors reveal, this leads to an inability to conduct grander strategy in warfare.
So instead: "unrestricted" warfare is to have strategy incorporate considerations (and interactions) within various domains, not only the military domain. Basically it is a rejection of the post-Westphalian concept of the nation-state as the supreme (and exclusive) kind of agent in strategy. This is good. The post-Westphalian idea of the nation-state may be useful in certain contexts and for certain purposes, but it is NOT the comprehensive reality of the universe. To treat it as such is to be blind to much of reality, and to live in a fantasy world. Does North Korea really care that it is "unrecognized" as a nation by us? Nope. Because the nation-state idea simply doesn't describe the order in which NK exists, so much as it describes the order in which Germany exists.
This is all well and good. But is it truly revolutionary or new? I don't think so. Clausewitz himself writes that there is no military situation abstracted from the political situation, and politics (in this sense) involves much more than just inter-governmental relations. Rather, I think that we can treat this as a corrective against modern American oversimplifications and reductions, and thus as a "return" to older concepts of strategy and statesmanship. Indeed, they even imitate and follow Clausewitz's guidance on method for determining a theory of warfare which is inductive/a posteriori, rather than deductive/a priori. Unfortunately, the one "modern" example of a war they have to analyze is the Gulf War, and so they relentlessly analyze it alone, perhaps leading to imbalance.
And here is where the rhetoric is overblown. This is no "master plan" to destroy America (false advertising). It's not even really new concepts. Rather, it is a (very) forceful reminder against the false (and harmful) modernist sentiments that prevail in America's mode of conducting warfare. In reference to false understandings, the authors actually accuse Americans of "touching the elephant" - an allusion to the tale of "blind men and the elephant" (although this allusion is not made clear in the text, and so is confusing if you have not heard of the tale). It is a parable about believing one has the absolute truth, while only having a limited perspective. Perhaps the authors also touch the elephant in a few ways (bias for helicopters without empirical evidence, a near-religious adoration of the golden ratio, etc.).
There's a final point of balance that is perhaps needed. It is easy to either dismiss the Chinese critiques of American society ("we don't worship tech") or take them too seriously ("tech is evil"). Either reaction is problematic. Instead we need to understand that just as in some other areas, there is a rhetorical/political purpose at play. America is being made fun of (which means that the critiques are both based in reality, but also somewhat biased for the sake of local humor). Technology is not evil, and technology is not God. So we need to learn to avoid seeing technological advancement as a replacement for people (this is the error the authors would like to point out). This doesn't mean avoiding technological advancement.
There are many lessons to be learned from this book. I'd advise it for all military officers to read. However, I also would advise to temper the expectations and reframe the reader's conception of what the book is: it is an exercise in recovery of some older strategic concepts, not a revolutionary approach to destroying the United States. Get past and ignore the rhetoric and advertising, and take the lessons where they make valid points about where we can be short-sighted in our mindset. But don't discount those lessons because of the wild rhetoric and advertising which surround them. Doing this, you will profit.
The book is no “master plan.” It is a discussion of modern warfare strategy written by readers of the worldwide military strategy publications. Most of the publications have been in the United States and China. The cover of this book is misleading with the statement, “Wake up, America.” This book should be little interest to the non-military American. But it should be read by anyone with potential requirements for field grade service (Major and above,) or higher (and equivalent strategy levels in the Marines, Air Force, and Navy.) As far as “Wake Up,” I can recall discussions about strategy that contained most of the information provided within the book as a staff field grade officer in the US Army. While as military officers, we need to be aware of these issues, we are not entirely ignorant of them. The book provides a somewhat different perspective of the issues from a Chinese viewpoint.
The first point the authors make, how technology precedes its best employment in warfare. Most of the technology discussed concerns the information processing capabilities of both computers and software. It is more than computerized warfare. A large part of this is based on the technology to US Forces but not entirely. Part of the problem with technology is that mankind becomes so used to using technology to solve today’s problems that previous methods of solving problems are lost. Thus, if the technology can be crippled, it represents an exploitable weakness in war.
The second point made, is that the military forces now must consider nonmilitary actions if it is to be effective in both defense and offense. Warfare developed from point battlefields (using swords, knives, etc.,) to linear battlefields (using machine guns and artillery,) to area battlefields, to 3D battlefields (using aircraft and missiles,) to modern infinite-dimensional battlefields which include space, electromagnetic spectrums, and civilian actions. If one can start a war in a computer room or a stock exchange, is there a non-battle space anywhere? Warfare that transcends military boundaries is “unrestricted warfare.” A “kinder warfare” with critical attacks that take no lives is now possible. Technology is providing a means to attack and enemy’s nerve centers without directly harming anything else. Such nerve centers exist in an enemy’s financial systems, their economic systems, their environmental systems, their public media systems, their political systems, their power and energy systems, and their logistics centers.
A third point made is that coalitions of disparate forces, internationally, nationally, and military, are formed and broken very quickly, as quickly as within 24 hours! For example, in Desert Storm, the United States weaved together more than 30 nations in various roles. The author’s prescient comment foresaw the alignments that occurred immediately following the 9/11 attack, although this was after the book was written and not available to the authors to use as an example. There was also unity of command established. This, the authors say, stemmed from the US DoD Reorganization Act passed by Congress in 1986. All of the air forces and naval forces were under General Schwartzkopf despite the desires of the individual forces to operate independently. The air tasking order (a 300-page document) drafted in joint sessions by the Air Force, Navy and Marines, had to be approved by General Schwartzkopf before commands were issued to the various forces. The Kuwaiti Invasion Plan that the Marines wanted was put off in favor of the plan that General Schwartzkopf endorsed. Media personnel were incorporated into the military units but controlled with definitions of release timing and content.
A fourth point is that Americans want wars which achieve its national interests while having no causalities. This promotes an over-reliance on technology and an unwillingness to support prolonged war. Americans have a blind faith in technology always thinking that the road to victory is with the highest technology weapons. American military budgets are based largely on the acquisition of expensive weapon systems, and little thought given to their integrated use within the military services. American military theory is behind (consistent with point one above.) But the overriding goal is victory without casualties. Thus, the authors recommend that the secret to war with America is to kill its rank and file soldiers.
The style of the book is somewhat elliptical: it is written in the Chinese manner which often dances around a subject before coming to its subject. For example, there is a discussion of the Golden Ratio (1:0.618) before the authors show how it can be found in various ancient and modern military operations. There is considerable Chinese military philosophy discussed including the 36 Strategies, which most American military readers have not encountered ( did not at West Point when I was a Cadet studying Chinese!) I first encountered these after a reference from a Chinese Professor while I was teaching in China and then read Sun Tzu in Chinese. Sun Tzu was not the original author of these. In my personal opinion, an English translation this short book should be required reading for all Cadets at West Point.
I rate the book 3 stars for several reasons. I don’t feel the book is well written. Many of the references are transliterations of the author’s names in Chinese which do not read as the real names. At this time, the book is somewhat dated having been written in 1999. I also doubt the attribution of the source and authors of the book. The concepts presented in the book are worth thinking about for a person developing military strategies.
Top reviews from other countries
A must read for anyone wanting to understand China's political leaders' mindset.





