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Disarming Iraq Hardcover – March 1, 2004
by
Hans Blix
(Author)
| Price | New from | Used from |
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The chairman of the International Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction and the former leader of the U.N.'s weapons inspection team provides an objective, firsthand account of the events leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, detailing meetings with international leaders, the activities of his inspection team, and more. 75,000 first printing.
- Print length304 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPantheon Books
- Publication dateMarch 1, 2004
- Dimensions6.42 x 1.23 x 9.48 inches
- ISBN-100375423028
- ISBN-13978-0375423024
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Reviewed in the United States on June 6, 2014
Read this book if you want a seemingly balanced account of the lead up to the Iraq War. Very informative from someone who has completed two tours in Iraq and wants to understand why we entered that quagmire to begin with.
Reviewed in the United States on August 23, 2018
Good
Reviewed in the United States on November 18, 2022
"Disarming Iraq" is a fascinating diplomatic memoir about the run up to the 2003 Iraq war. The author, Hans Blix, was a Swedish lawyer, arms control expert, and international civil servant. When the U.S. put Iraq at the top of the UN agenda in 2002, Blix was tapped to run the program to uncover and dismantle Iraq's stockpile of WMDs. The UN's hope was to disarm Iraq before the crisis escalated into war. As the world eventually discovered, the fearsome Iraqi weapons turned out to be non-existent, despite the alarmist claims and faulty intelligence of the Bush Administration, which raced to invade Iraq before Blix could finish his work. Had the U.S. shown a bit of patience, the whole tragedy could have been avoided.
In sober, measured prose, Blix reconstructs the pre-war diplomacy at the UN, records his interactions with statesmen such as Tony Blair, Condie Rice, and Kofi Annan, and describes the activities of UN inspectors in Iraq. He is consistently balanced and nonjudgmental, even though he clearly felt lingering bitterness at his treatment by the U.S. His book would be a tonic for IR students in the grip of "rational actor" models of international relations. It should also be of interest to diplomats as a case study of the disasters that can ensue when ordinary prudence is hijacked by hubris, faulty assumptions, and irresponsible power.
"Disarming Iraq" is excellent. Although the book was published in 2004, it remains timely in 2022 -- as shown by the mess Russia has created for itself in Ukraine. Hubris and faulty assumptions are forever with us.
In sober, measured prose, Blix reconstructs the pre-war diplomacy at the UN, records his interactions with statesmen such as Tony Blair, Condie Rice, and Kofi Annan, and describes the activities of UN inspectors in Iraq. He is consistently balanced and nonjudgmental, even though he clearly felt lingering bitterness at his treatment by the U.S. His book would be a tonic for IR students in the grip of "rational actor" models of international relations. It should also be of interest to diplomats as a case study of the disasters that can ensue when ordinary prudence is hijacked by hubris, faulty assumptions, and irresponsible power.
"Disarming Iraq" is excellent. Although the book was published in 2004, it remains timely in 2022 -- as shown by the mess Russia has created for itself in Ukraine. Hubris and faulty assumptions are forever with us.
Reviewed in the United States on March 16, 2004
Disarming Iraq by Hans Blix provides some interesting insights into the Iraqi WMD debate from the man in the vortex of that pre-war debate.
As one would suspect from a book written by a scientist cum international bureaucrat, the text is somewhat turgid and at times it takes a bit of slogging to get through the text.
That being said, the book is pretty interesting. The major thing that strikes one, especially given the post-war realization that WMD's weren't in Iraq, is Blix's pre-war conviction, based more on a gut feeling rather than any special insight, data or analysis, that WMD's probably did exist in some significant concentrations.
The other interesting conclusion of the book is Mr. Blix's assertion that the fault for the conflict rests, basically, with Saddam Hussein. Granted, Mr. Blix does have some very pointed, and not very complimentary remarks to make about the positions and actions of Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair. He definitely feels that the inspection process should have been accorded more time to do its work and is pretty critical of some of the timelines the Americans and British placed upon the process. On the other hand, he explicitly points to the fact that the Iraqi regime never, at any time, lived up to either the letter or the spirit of UN resolution 1441. He also agrees that, once the military buildup had reached a critical mass having it simple sit in lace indefinitely was not a viable option for anyone. The 1441 resolution was unanimous, the force was present, the decision to comply or defy rested with Saddam. It was, in effect, says Mr. Blix, Saddam' own obduracy that, in the end, did him in.
In the end what Mr. Blix communicates is an overwhelming sense of frustration. He truly believes that, given a reasonable continuation of proximate implied force and sufficient time, the inspection regime would have worked. The fundamental question, which Blix can present but not answer, is whether, in the final analysis, WMD's were the reason or the pretext for the war. If the former, his argument for more time is persuasive. If the latter, it's irrelevant, as any of a slew of other pretexts could have-and would have-- been concocted by the Americans and British to justify invading.
I doubt this book will change many minds--those who opposed the war will find fodder for their cause. UN haters will simply see evidence of the anti-US bias they always see at the UN. However, for the objective reader--if there are any out there--this is a uniquely informative read.
As one would suspect from a book written by a scientist cum international bureaucrat, the text is somewhat turgid and at times it takes a bit of slogging to get through the text.
That being said, the book is pretty interesting. The major thing that strikes one, especially given the post-war realization that WMD's weren't in Iraq, is Blix's pre-war conviction, based more on a gut feeling rather than any special insight, data or analysis, that WMD's probably did exist in some significant concentrations.
The other interesting conclusion of the book is Mr. Blix's assertion that the fault for the conflict rests, basically, with Saddam Hussein. Granted, Mr. Blix does have some very pointed, and not very complimentary remarks to make about the positions and actions of Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair. He definitely feels that the inspection process should have been accorded more time to do its work and is pretty critical of some of the timelines the Americans and British placed upon the process. On the other hand, he explicitly points to the fact that the Iraqi regime never, at any time, lived up to either the letter or the spirit of UN resolution 1441. He also agrees that, once the military buildup had reached a critical mass having it simple sit in lace indefinitely was not a viable option for anyone. The 1441 resolution was unanimous, the force was present, the decision to comply or defy rested with Saddam. It was, in effect, says Mr. Blix, Saddam' own obduracy that, in the end, did him in.
In the end what Mr. Blix communicates is an overwhelming sense of frustration. He truly believes that, given a reasonable continuation of proximate implied force and sufficient time, the inspection regime would have worked. The fundamental question, which Blix can present but not answer, is whether, in the final analysis, WMD's were the reason or the pretext for the war. If the former, his argument for more time is persuasive. If the latter, it's irrelevant, as any of a slew of other pretexts could have-and would have-- been concocted by the Americans and British to justify invading.
I doubt this book will change many minds--those who opposed the war will find fodder for their cause. UN haters will simply see evidence of the anti-US bias they always see at the UN. However, for the objective reader--if there are any out there--this is a uniquely informative read.
Reviewed in the United States on March 16, 2004
This is a remarkably even-handed discussion of the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the ensuing Iraq War of 2003. With the patience of a professor outlining an argument on the board, Blix presents all sides of the issues dispassionately and, so far as I can tell, unpartisanly.
Blix originally believed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, and so he eagerly accepted his assignment to head the UN inspection team. He and his searchers targeted the areas that international intelligence agencies assured President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were repositories of weapons. Finding nothing in any of them, Blix began to suspect that both he and the intelligence agencies were mistaken. Failure to find weapons of mass destruction after the fall of Saddam Hussein further convinced Blix that any such weapons that survived the 1991 Iraq War had been destroyed by 1994. Saddam had even offered (finally) documentary evident to that effect in February 2003, but it was too late to prevent the war the following month.
Why, then, did Saddam refuse for the most part to cooperate with UN inspectors? Blix surmises that any number of reasons might've contributed to his stubbornness: pride, a sense of invulnerability, a fear that weapons inspectors were also spies, an unwillingness to accept foreign supervision. Regardless of the possible reasons, however, Blix is convinced that one of them was NOT that Saddam had anything to hide when it came to weapons of mass destruction.
Blix is also convinced that President Bush wouldn't have gone to war had he not been persuaded that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. The war was no vendetta, says Blix, and so wasn't inevitable. Had he been allowed a few more months to inspect, he's certain he could've marshalled sufficient evidence to have prevented the war.
Blix argues that the fall of Saddam is a good thing, but he also concludes that the balance sheet of the war is still in the negative. Getting rid of Saddam is a bonus, but it's outweighed so far by the increase in terrorism, the deaths of both civilians and military personnel in Iraq, and the social turmoil that continues in Iraq. Blix believes that neither the UK nor the US showed sufficient critical judgment in going to war. His final estimation is that there just weren't reasonable grounds for doing so.
A well-documented, excellently-argued book. Highly recommended.
Blix originally believed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, and so he eagerly accepted his assignment to head the UN inspection team. He and his searchers targeted the areas that international intelligence agencies assured President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were repositories of weapons. Finding nothing in any of them, Blix began to suspect that both he and the intelligence agencies were mistaken. Failure to find weapons of mass destruction after the fall of Saddam Hussein further convinced Blix that any such weapons that survived the 1991 Iraq War had been destroyed by 1994. Saddam had even offered (finally) documentary evident to that effect in February 2003, but it was too late to prevent the war the following month.
Why, then, did Saddam refuse for the most part to cooperate with UN inspectors? Blix surmises that any number of reasons might've contributed to his stubbornness: pride, a sense of invulnerability, a fear that weapons inspectors were also spies, an unwillingness to accept foreign supervision. Regardless of the possible reasons, however, Blix is convinced that one of them was NOT that Saddam had anything to hide when it came to weapons of mass destruction.
Blix is also convinced that President Bush wouldn't have gone to war had he not been persuaded that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. The war was no vendetta, says Blix, and so wasn't inevitable. Had he been allowed a few more months to inspect, he's certain he could've marshalled sufficient evidence to have prevented the war.
Blix argues that the fall of Saddam is a good thing, but he also concludes that the balance sheet of the war is still in the negative. Getting rid of Saddam is a bonus, but it's outweighed so far by the increase in terrorism, the deaths of both civilians and military personnel in Iraq, and the social turmoil that continues in Iraq. Blix believes that neither the UK nor the US showed sufficient critical judgment in going to war. His final estimation is that there just weren't reasonable grounds for doing so.
A well-documented, excellently-argued book. Highly recommended.

