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Diplomacy Hardcover – April 18, 1994
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- Print length912 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherSimon & Schuster
- Publication dateApril 18, 1994
- Dimensions6.5 x 1.75 x 9.5 inches
- ISBN-10067165991X
- ISBN-13978-0671659912
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Simon and Schuster, 1994
912 pages.
In his capacity as both the National Security Advisor and as the Secretary of State for two different presidents Henry Kissinger redefined the nature and scope of American diplomacy. He served in the most tumultuous administration of the twentieth century yet managed to invigorate foreign policy in what was also the nadir of executive prestige. With Richard Nixon he formulated a grand strategy based on the twin principles of Wilsonian idealism and European realpolitik that led to a period of geopolitical stability in the midst of America's extrication from the Vietnam quagmire. The Nixon-Kissinger team reshaped the nature of Soviet-American relations and introduced a period of détente using triangular diplomacy and the concept of linkage. As both an academic and as a practitioner of the art, Kissinger describes in his book the evolution and philosophical heritage of American diplomacy and its impact on global and regional stability during its rapid ascendancy as a superpower in the twentieth century. Kissinger provides both the casual reader and the foreign policy maven a refreshing history of American foreign policy as a reflection of its uniquely benign belief in its own exceptionalism.
In Diplomacy Kissinger lists two primary schools of thought that govern the conduct and define the characteristics of foreign policy. European diplomacy in its current form traces its roots to Cardinal Richelieu and the primacy of the state. Raison d'etat radically altered international relations because it provided the philosophical justification towards the secularization of national interest. No longer under the suffocating aegis of the church, nations shrugged off idealistic endeavors in favor of policies that provided tangible benefits. The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the modern state system and ushered in a tumultuous period due to the lack of a confluence of common interests and a shared system of values in the concert of nations. Following the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars Metternich presided over a period of relative stability in Europe by positioning the decaying Austrian Empire as the fulcrum of the European balance of power. In his relentless pursuit towards the creation of a unified Germany, Bismarck dispensed with incremental gains and boldly asserted Prussian hegemony with a series of wars buttressed by peace settlements that consolidated his gains. Bismarck unhinged the Vienna settlement and dealt the existing balance a mortal blow. The cold calculus of raw power supplanted the Metternich consensus of legitimacy and in the wake of the entangling system of alliances that ensued, a European conflagration became almost inevitable. Indeed the singular practice of realpolitik, Kissinger asserts, "turned on itself" .
Whereas realpolitik was distilled from the crucible of armed conflict, Wilsonian idealism reflected the triumphs of democracy and manifest destiny, together with the unshakeable belief in the exportability of the uniquely American system of values. While Kissinger lauds the style and substance of American diplomacy he nonetheless insists on the exercise of restraint governed by the realization of American national interest. According to Kissinger the most successful American statesmen were those capable of blending Wilsonian idealism with realpolitik. While Wilson provided the conceptual basis for American foreign policy in its ascendancy as a great power, he was unable to realize his objectives. A generation later, Roosevelt, borrowing heavily from Wilson's Fourteen Points, co-authored the Atlantic Charter and provided the framework for the United Nations. Roosevelt was successful because he possessed a surer grasp of the tenor of national consensus. He advanced Wilson's idealism and accepted the responsibilities of great power status yet accepted the territorial aggrandizement of the Soviet Union. The nation that implemented the Marshall Plan and sponsored the economic recovery of its former enemies was the same nation that unleashed weapons of unprecedented destructiveness on Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
Kissinger's analysis of American diplomacy during the Cold War is particularly noteworthy. From the prescient George Kennan to the equally remarkable Ronald Reagan, Kissinger chronicles the evolution of American strategies of containment. As a statesman he refrains from the insensitive criticism of an academic, and as an academic he bases his analysis on research rather than a political or personal agenda. Kissinger traces the theoretical origins of Cold War diplomacy in the Truman administration through its first tests in Greece and Turkey and armed intervention in Korea. He clarifies the persisting debate on Vietnam and rather than vilifying a single administration as is the popular pastime of many historians, he traces the efforts of four separate presidents and nearly twenty years of American involvement. It is remarkable, however, that Kissinger merely brushes over an event as significant as the Cuban missile crisis.
Although Kissinger devotes the majority of his book to American diplomacy, he evaluates the actions of both allies and adversaries and their respective impact on the geopolitical environment. He supports Kennan's thesis that the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable but credits American diplomacy with limiting Soviet aggression and containing communist infiltration in regions vital to American interests.
American diplomacy, Kissinger asserts, is the product of American exceptionalism and democratic necessity. Lacking the unifying force of an opposing superpower, the United States may again fall victim to the siren song of isolationism. Kissinger devotes the final pages of his book to a call for the development of a national interest. National interest will undoubtedly combine elements of realpolitik and Wilsonian idealism and define limits in order to prevent the exhaustion of American will and an overextension of American capabilities. National interest will also provide the requisites for unilateral action in a world increasingly suspicious of the military, economic, and cultural domination of the sole superpower. The current outlook is not auspicious. Western Europe, for the most part a steadfast ally during the Cold War, is breaking ranks and currently one of the most vociferous critics of American foreign policy. Future administrations face new challenges in an increasingly complicated new world order where simple geopolitical calculations are rendered useless and threats to American security span continents in the form of decentralized terrorist cells. However, America has answered challenges to the Wilsonian goals of peace, stability, progress, and freedom for mankind with resolve and moral conviction in the twentieth century. And though it may be a "journey that has no end," Kissinger's faith in the purpose and goals of American diplomacy remains unshakable.
for May. I recommend his books On China, World Order, and A World Restored (?). Here in Diplomacy
he makes a sweeping study of history, going back to the Holy Roman Empire. He goes through major
turning points like the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of Vienna (after 1815), and the Treaty
of Versailles (1918-19). These key moments helped to forge the balance of power and the world order
of the modern nation state. There are many figures like Cardinal Richelieu, Napoleon, Metternich
and Bismarck.
Being from the Old World, Kissinger has more of an instinctive knowledge of obscure events from long
ago, and how they have parallels in contemporary current events. Europeans tended to have more of
a realist view of the need for the balance of power to maintain peace, while Americans have an idealistic
sense of encouraging democracy and human rights around the world. Kissinger contrasts the idealistic
Wilsonianism with the more realist views of Teddy Roosevelt. Although Nixon became less popular than
TR, he had a similar brilliance in understanding the balance of power. But for most of the 20th century,
idealism clearly won out over realism, with figures like JFK and Reagan. Once again, I don't understand
why Kissinger is viewed as an amoral strategist. He clearly is seeking peace, but comes from an Old
Europe view of the balance of power, based on deep knowledge of history.
Kissinger gives an insightful psychoanalysis of Stalin and Hitler, along with laudatory studies of FDR
and Churchill. Then there's a lengthy discussion of the diplomacy of the Cold War. As an intellectual,
Kissinger tends to underestimate Reagan, but there's little doubt that his diplomacy worked. The
history continues right to the New World Order of Bush 41 and the beginning of the Clinton
administration. Many disagree with Kissinger, but the breadth and scope of his knowledge of the
subject almost requires that one go through his book learning and life experience, if you want to
learn about diplomacy.
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Suggestion: remove or decrease the max word requirement for 5 star ratings.
Next time I will not give feedback if it is 5 star, because I do not have what more to say than "It is all good"
The dynamics of the Europe's powers before World War 1, America's neutrality and the end thereof is well written. Kissinger brings us through the Paris 1919 Peace Conference, WW II and the Cold War with such clarity and insight that the reader can extrapolate what can happen with regards to Trump's foreign policies and the Brexit as well as Putin's Яussia









