In Power versus Prudence Paul develops a prudential-realist model, arguing that a nation's national nuclear choices depend on specific regional security contexts: the non-great power states most likely to forgo nuclear weapons are those in zones of low and moderate conflict, while nations likely to acquire such capability tend to be in zones of high conflict and engaged in protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. He demonstrates that the choice to forbear acquiring nuclear weapons is also a function of the extent of security interdependence that states experience with other states, both allies and adversaries. He applies the comparative case study method to pairs of states with similar characteristics - Germany/Japan, Canada/Australia, Sweden/Switzerland, Argentina/Brazil - in addition to analysing the nuclear choices of South Africa, Ukraine, South Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel. Paul concludes by questioning some of the prevailing supply side approaches to non-proliferation, offering an explication of the security variable by linking nuclear proliferation with protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. Power versus Prudence will be of interest to students of international relations, policy-makers, policy analysts, and the informed public concerned with the questions of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, and disarmament.
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This book is quite revolutionary because instead of asking the question why states develop nuclear weapons, T.V. Paul ask why, despite their perceived utility, states choose NOT to develop nuclear weapons. Situated within the realist school of thought, it offers a new way of looking at deterrence in conflict prone regions.
This book has some interesting insights. However, there are quite a few factual errors. For example, he states that Brazil signed the NPT in 1996. First, Brazil acceded to the Treaty in 1998, not 1996. Moreover, in the non-proliferation literature, there is a difference between signing and ratifying/acceding. The fact that Brazil did not accede to the Treaty until 3 years (not one, as he suggests) after Argentina did is not problematized. Thus the factual errors, in my mind, also cast doubt on the quality of his analysis. My advice to anyone using this book is to cross-reference the facts with another source.