This book contains a number of papers written by academic economists on the subject of public choice economics as applied to international organisations. It was published in 1991 but remains relevant today as international organisations continue to expand their scope. The book is most likely to be of interest to economists who already have at least a basic understanding of public choice economics.
The book contains some general papers on the public choice approach and some specific papers that look at applications to particular international bodies. The specific papers identify the main individuals, their incentives, their policy preferences and the decision-making institutions. Economists will find these specific case studies very useful as a guide to how they can prepare public choice analyses of their own.
As ever with public choice economics many of the themes evident in the book will ring true with the reader, such as collusion amongst governments to avoid competition, shirking domestic responsibility for unpopular policies, using international meetings to get media coverage and provide mutual approval to stifle criticism, moving unpopular activities to an international body (the “dirty work” hypothesis) and the steady expansion of headcount and salaries (as highlighted in the excellent paper on the IMF). As noted in the book, international organisations may change their name or lose their function, but rarely die.