Reviewed in International Relations Vol14 No5 August 1999 by Vladimir Matveyev, Moscow State Institute of International Studies - [...]
There is undoubtedly a need for a comprehensive study of the UN Secretariat. The Secretariat was conceived and continues to be one of `the principle organs' of the United Nations. It is the only major organ that expresses the identity and permanence of the organization as a whole. The UN's founding fathers entrusted the Secretariat solely with administrative tasks. In reality, for many reasons including its permanence, influence, the quality and quantity of its personnel, its direct involvement in peacekeeping and other operations of the utmost importance all over the world, `the Secretary-General and the Secretariat officials have a certain leeway of freedom of action which prevents them from being brought down to the rank of simple bureaucrats'. Some new functions of the Secretariat stretching beyond its mandate appeared quite recently and representatives of dozens of smaller, newly independent states ask Secretariat officials to provide them with information, analysis and advice.
But criticism of the Secretariat's work at the end of the century is now heard from all corners. In her statement of 8 June 1993, quoted by Ameri, Ambassador Madeleine Albright strongly reproached the Secretariat's staff for the misuse of funds and for misconduct, for `waste, fraud and abuse', to name just a few of her accusations. Ameri remarks in this regard that `while these criticisms are, for the most part, justified, they should nevertheless be seen in their proper political context'.
Almost no one today disputes the inadequate performance of the UN bureaucracy. Yet, as Professor Ameri points out, it is the member states who are partly, if not mostly, responsible for the shortcomings of the Secretariat. Though they pay lip service to the need for reform, they are reluctant to pass from rhetoric to concrete and constructive actions. Moreover, as is shown in every chapter of this book, the basic principles of UN staff recruitment and conduct as defined in the UN charter and in the Staff Regulations of 1952, have not infrequently fallen victim to indirect interference and direct pressure from representatives of various states and groups of states for purely political considerations. This practice of political favouritism still continues. The history of the Secretariat's creation as well as the principles and methods of recruitment and the appointment of its personnel, as described by Professor Ameri in historical retrospective and in detail, are highly illustrative of the power struggle that has interfered with the normal work of the UN staff.
In 1952 the Staff Regulations adopted by the General Assembly fully confirmed the concept and principles of the UN Charter, and, above all, the independence and neutrality of the UN employees and their absolute loyalty to the organization. A formula for the recruitment of professional staff (Article 101-3 of the Charter) is that the paramount consideration should be `the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible'. In practice, it seems that member states, the influential and not so influential, large and small, have all tended to ignore the need for a proper equilibrium between merit and the equitable distribution of posts. Finally this attitude has had the effect of relegating the principle of merit to a secondary position. In the first months and even years of the Secretariat's existence, citizens of the United States, Canada and west European countries were excessively over-represented on its staff. Later efforts to change the situation by giving preference to nationals from Africa and Asia produced new imbalances and, as a result, new demands for more reasonable distribution. The former socialist countries, for their part, did not allow their citizens to be employed on a permanent basis which led to their under-representation and corresponding grievances. In the last decade demands from newly independent states for more posts in the Secretariat, largely for reasons of prestige, has inevitably resulted in further lowering the Secretariat's quality and competence.
Designed in 1945 as a truly harmonious international body serving the world community as a whole, the Secretariat has, however, often tended to serve the parochial interests of certain states and groups of states. Under the statute, government representatives are precluded from interfering with the work of the Appointment and Promotion Board of the Secretariat. Such interference would establish between the staff member and the authorities of his home country a relation of dependency in contravention of the principle of the complete independence of the international civil service towards any authority external to the UN. In practice, as Ameri points out, members of the Board are not infrequently approached by national delegations in order to persuade them to support particular appointments and promotions. Ameri refers to the authoritative opinion of N. A. Graham and R. S. Jordan who wrote in 1980 that `...almost all Member States have contributed to the weakening of the United Nations' independence by applying political pressure to secure positions for their own nationals'.
All levels and all divisions of the Secretariat suffer from excessive politicization - recruitment, promotion, training, management and programme implementation, to name a few. In Ameri's opinion, many causes of this lasting malaise are of external origin and cannot be successfully acted upon by the Secretariat until the UN member states themselves review their attitude towards the Secretariat. `...Any significant restructuring will, by definition, require not only the element of political will on the part of member states, but also a degree of consensus among the major powers and perhaps some altruism'. Professor Ameri does not believe that this can be done successfully under the present circumstances.
The perspective is not, however, wholly pessimistic. There are shortcomings which can be eliminated by the Secretariat itself since they are internally generated. In this respect Professor Ameri thinks that the bulk of the work lies with the Secretary-General. In order to improve the situation radically `...he will have to do things that will be contrary to the factors or conditions that prompted his election to his post. He will also have to take some very unpopular measures as far as his staff members are concerned'. Since the power of appointment belongs exclusively to the Secretary-General he has the right to reject any outside interference. One can only wonder whether it is possible for him to do so.
Writing about more concrete improvements with regard to staff recruitment at lower levels, Ameri suggests that the Secretariat should broaden the base from which candidates are selected. To this end it should abandon unnecessary secrecy, advertise posts in the world press, and announce vacancies speedily and in a manner which would reach as many potential candidates as possible. Entrance examinations should be held not only for junior level staff (P1-P2), but also for the higher (P3-P4) levels. He also advises that governments should offer several candidates for any particular post. The system of granting permanent contracts that currently commits the UN to keeping employees indefinitely should also be re-evaluated. This would allow it to get rid of a lot of `dead wood'. Ameri does not believe it is possible to eliminate political pressure altogether, but the creation of as many safeguards, checks and balances as possible might minimize it, and would raise the integrity and independence of the Secretariat's staff.
Professor Ameri's suggestions with regard to the problems of management might also be seen as most thought-provoking. Inadequate management or, in certain cases, its absence in the 1990s brought about distressing political repercussions, including damaging the implementation of the UN's most important actions such as peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Ameri considers the technical and political problems facing the UN to be closely inter-related. His hope is that member states will understand the necessity and the urgency of resolving at least some of the problems confronting the Secretariat. This expectation is substantiated by the following logical conclusions, `...If the present negative trends continue, they are not only likely to tax the patience of the states and the public, they will certainly also undermine their belief in the Organization's worth and viability. This would, in turn, threaten to exhaust the willingness of member governments to commit the necessary resources to it, thereby running the risk of harming beyond repair the effectiveness of the UN as a whole'. A rise in the quality and competence of the Secretariat's staff as well as proper management would `favorably affect the image of the UN in general and its staff in part
