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The Burma Road : The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II Paperback – Bargain Price, September 1, 2004
| Donovan Webster (Author) Find all the books, read about the author, and more. See search results for this author |
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- Print length400 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPsrsnnial,2004
- Publication dateSeptember 1, 2004
- ISBN-100060746386
- ISBN-13978-0060746384
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Product details
- ASIN : B0009309A4
- Publisher : Psrsnnial,2004 (September 1, 2004)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 400 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0060746386
- ISBN-13 : 978-0060746384
- Item Weight : 12 ounces
- Best Sellers Rank: #10,636,141 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #7,875 in Southeast Asia History
- #11,809 in Japanese History (Books)
- #12,787 in India History
- Customer Reviews:
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The book is mostly on operations executed by the American general Stilwell-led Chinese X Force that opened supply line to China cut by the Japanese forces when they captured Lashio during the opening phase of war in Burma. However before that could happen northern Burma had to be liberated from Japanese control.
Though well-written the author, however, has glossed over a few things which could have given more substance to his narrative. Firstly, on the Japanese invasion of Burma the author failed to provide strategic background to the campaign. It began with Japan’s war in China becoming interminable.
Japanese forces conquered large chunks of Chinese territory . But failed in inflicting a knock-out blow. Tokyo felt this was because the Chinese Nationalist forces were continuing to get supplies via French Indo China and Lashio in Burma . If these supply routes were cut the Chinese resistance would cease. This thinking underpinned Japan’s decision to occupy French Indo china and Burma
The Briton Harold Alexander was considered a lucky general. Why was this so?There are no reference to it in the book. Alexander arrived in Burma to replace Thomas J.Hutton as the new GOC of the British forces. Immediately upon his arrival he realized the campain in Burma was lost. Therfore decided to ignore his superior’s orders and withdraw. While engaged he narrowly escaped capture by Japanese patrols. So what happened?
Here the Japanese misjudged on account of failure by their battle field intelligence the British were withdrawing towards Rangoon; outcome of defeat inflicted near Sittang river bridge where 17th division was routed. Actually, the British were moving north. The Japanese commander Sakurai decided to trap the British forces by bringing his forces astride latter’s presumed path of retreat in a wide outflanking maneuver. The former narrowly missed coming in contact with British units that now crossed the path after Japanese had gone. The road was unbarred and the British escaped. What was significant the gap widened as the days went by with the British moving northwards and Japanese pressing towards the south.
The Burma campaign was a disaster for the Allies. Some war historians have claimed that it was not a retreat but a rout. Nevertheless, the Allied forces escaped annhilation. This would not have happened had the Japanese employed their airpower effectively.
It’s worth recalling by 1941, March 27 the Japanese enjoyed absolute air supremacy. Yet their airforces failed to harass,impede the withdrawal of Allied forces to an extent necessary which would have ensured its destruction by their ground troops.
This was on account of two factors. Firstly, the air units were commanded by the senior officers of the Imperial Army who lacked experience. Secondly, instead of attacking enemy troop concentrations and military the planes bombed cities in central and northern Burma causing heavy civilian casualties.
While Stilwell-led Chinese forces were busy fighting the Japanese in northern Burma came came the latter’s invasion of india.Here again author’s narrative is incomplete. He focusses too much attention on Kohima battle while ignoring equally important fought in the south near Imphal.
The Japanese invasion came along multiple axes: south,southeast,northeast of the city. Among the three the thrust that came along the northeastern axis was perhaps the most dangerous. The British never expected a move from this direction. Consequently this sector was lightly defended.
General Mutaguchi’s battle plan was brilliant. He correctly judged that the assault from the south and the southeastern axes would distract,divert British attention leaving Imphal’s defenses denuded. Unfortunately for the Japanese their crack 15th division ran smack on to an Indian parachute brigade at Sangshak. The paratroopers could not check the Japanese advance but managed to delay it sending the alarm bells ringing. The delay imposed gave sufficent time for the British to shore up Imphal’s defenses. This was done by bringing troops which were airlifted from the Arakan sector. The units of the 5th Indian division immediately went into action after deplaning from airfields near Imphal. The city was saved.
Despite the above omissions I don’t mind giving 4 stars for the book. The book has filled a big void in my understanding of CBI Theater of war. Generally, this is an ignored,neglected theater of war. All major histories on World War II do mention it albeit perfunctorily. This attitude has changed of late. The book is a manifestation such a changed mindset. Northern Burma saw some epic battles: Shadzup,Kamaing,Nhpum Ga,Myitkina. Of these most memorable was 13-day siege Nhpum Ga
Finally, the author has enlivened his narrative by sharing personal experiences traveling northeast India, Burma,Yunnan prov China while researching for the book. This too is appreciated.
This man, Donovan Webster, must have a near-genius IQ, maybe higher, to be able to recover the details he has presented in this book.
This book could easily, EASILY be a five-star book if he had simply pared it down. One comes away from reading this book feeling as though he himself has done as the characters in the book had to do -- cut through the jungle with a machete.
I get the impression that this writer appraised the problem correctly, but he didn't provide the correct solution. The problem is that you can wade through the Tuchman, Romanus and Sunderland volumes, and feel as though you have read WAR AND PEACE, only to come out wondering, "How am I going to master this material?" The solution that Webster has found is to confine the scope of the book to the Burma Road as much as possible, but to pour into that composition so many details that you are STILL obligated to read WAR AND PEACE, as it were, to get through this thing.
For example, he could have given us the QUADRANT CONFERENCE to hang our hat on, with the information that this was brought Mountbatten to Burma-India and set up the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). He could have even said that what led up to this was the successful "special forces" exploits of Wingate and his troops behind the Japanese lines in Burma. But he chose instead to tell us seemingly every patrol that took place in the two months or so of the campaign.
How many bridge blowups do we need to be told about? Couldn't you just say, "They blew up several bridges?" Instead of raising the reader's excitement, you have loaded so much comprehension upon him that he feels that he is a native bearer, a job that doesn't lend itself to being inspired by the machismo and success accomplished by Wingate's troops.
I personally wish that the author had stuck to his outline here, with its neat chronological guideposts, nailing the hat-hanging events with a reasonable amount of information, and sparing us this blessing he seems to want for remembering and presenting such minutiae. This could have been a great book; he had the material down. It is the writing of it that is lacking, the refusal to exercise a little extra decision-making that would have cut this down to size. Had he done this, this very well might be THE BOOK for all time from which the average WW II enthusiast could learn about the CBI Theater in World War II.



