In many respects, Brentano conducted pioneering analyses of problems that are currently in the focus of cognitive science and artificial intelligence: from the problem of reference to that of representation, from the problem of categorial classification to ontology and the cognitive analysis of natural language.
Brentano, in fact, dealt with and wrote on questions concerning the auditory stream (temporal apprehension), visual perception (continua, point of view, three-dimensional construction of phenomenal objects), intentionality, imagery, and conceptual space, considering these pertaining to a metaphysical enquiry. Moreover, Brentano displayed clear awareness of the complexity of problems and of the interrelations among different areas of inquiry. From this point of view, his theory, however complex, offers elements for the treatment of problems currently under investigation.
Brentano's work is an antidote against physicalism and logicism, which dominated the 20th century epistemology, and as such appears to be a good philosophy candidate for cognitive science."A set of knotty questions are implied in the very title of Brentano's work "Psychology from an empirical standpoint". To solve them, Albertazzi guides us systematically through Brentano's life and works, investigating into the inherent complexity of both his view of mental life and the related methodology. In so doing, she discloses a number of threads into the open texture of modern philosophy of mind."
Lia Formigari, Ordinary professor of Philosophy of Language, La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
This volume collects some of the most significant papers of Arthur Pap. Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This goes beyond the merely historical fact of Pap’s influential views of dispositional and modal concepts. Pap's writings in philosophy of science, modality, and philosophy of mathematics provide insightful alternative perspectives on philosophical problems of current interest.
In this book, the author defends a unified externalists account of propositional attitudes and reference, and formalizes this view within possible world semantics. He establishes a link between philosophical analyses of intentionality and reference, and formal semantic theories of discourse representation and context change. The relation between belief change and the semantic analyses of conditional sentences and evidential (knowledge) and buletic (desire) propositional attitudes is discussed extensively.
Audience: The book will be of interest to those involved in epistemology, and philosophy of the natural and social sciences, as well as feminist scholars in philosophy. The work will also be of value for theorists, methodologists, and feminist scholars in the natural and social sciences.
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Self-organization constitutes one of the most important theoretical debates in contemporary life sciences. The present book explores the relevance of the concept of self-organization and its impact on such scientific fields as: immunology, neurosciences, ecology and theories of evolution.
Historical aspects of the issue are also broached. Intuitions relative to self-organization can be found in the works of such key western philosophical figures as Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant. Interacting with more recent authors and cybernetics, self-organization represents a notion in keeping with the modern world's discovery of radical complexity.
The themes of teleology and emergence are analyzed by philosophers of sciences with regards to the issues of modelization and scientific explanation.
The implications of self-organization for life sciences are here approached from an interdisciplinary angle, revealing the notion as already rewarding and full of promise for the future.
Can a line be analysed mathematically such a way that it does not fall apart into a set of discrete points? Are there objects of pure mathematics that can change through time? L. E. J. Brouwer argued that the two questions are related and that the answer to both is "yes", introducing the concept of choice sequences. This book subjects Brouwer's choice sequences to a phenomenological critique in the style of Husserl.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic is the logic of knowledge change. This book provides various logics to support such formal specifications, including proof systems. Concrete examples and epistemic puzzles enliven the exposition. The book also offers exercises with answers. It is suitable for graduate courses in logic. Many examples, exercises, and thorough completeness proofs and expressivity results are included. A companion web page offers slides for lecturers and exams for further practice.
Diagrammatology investigates the role of diagrams for thought and knowledge. Based on the general doctrine of diagrams in Charles Peirce's mature work, Diagrammatology claims diagrams to constitute a centerpiece of epistemology. This book reflects Peirce's work on the issue in Husserl's contemporaneous doctrine of categorical intuition and charts the many unnoticed similarities between Peircean semiotics and early Husserlian phenomenology.
Believing the wrong thing can have drastic consequences. The question of when a person is not only ill-guided, but genuinely at fault for holding a particular belief goes to the root of our understanding of such notions as criminal negligence and moral responsibility. This book explores the conditions under which someone may be deemed blameworthy for holding a particular belief, drawing on contemporary epistemology, ethics and legal scholarship.
Theories about the ontological structure of the world have generally been described in informal, intuitive terms. This book offers an account of the general features and methodology of formal ontology. The book defends conceptual realism as the best system to adopt based on a logic of natural kinds. By formally reconstructing an intuitive, informal ontological scheme as a formal ontology we can better determine the consistency and adequacy of that scheme.
Kuhn and Feyerabend formulated the problem, Dilworth provides the solution. In the fourth edition of this highly original book, Craig Dilworth answers the questions raised by the incommensurability thesis. Logical empiricism cannot account for theory conflict. Popperianism cannot account for how one theory is a progression beyond another. Dilworth’s Perspectivist conception of science covers both bases with a concept of scientific progress based on both rationalism and empiricism.
Borders enclose and separate us. We assign to them tremendous significance. Along them we draw supposedly uncrossable boundaries within which we believe our individual identities begin and end, erecting the metaphysical dividing walls that enclose each one of us into numerically identical, numerically distinct, entities: persons. Do the borders between us - physical, psychological, neurological, causal, spatial, temporal, etc. - merit the metaphysical significance ordinarily accorded them? The central thesis of I Am You is that our borders do not signify boundaries between persons. We are all the same person. Variations on this heretical theme have been voiced periodically throughout the ages (the Upanishads, Averroës, Giordano Bruno, Josiah Royce, Schrödinger, Fred Hoyle, Freeman Dyson). In presenting his arguments, the author relies on detailed analyses of recent formal work on personal identity, especially that of Derek Parfit, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert Nozick, David Wiggins, Daniel C. Dennett and Thomas Nagel, while incorporating the views of Descartes, Leibniz, Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, Kant, Husserl and Brouwer. His development of the implied moral theory is inspired by, and draws on, Rawls, Sidgwick, Kant and again Parfit. The traditional, commonsense view that we are each a separate person numerically identical to ourselves over time, i.e., that personal identity is closed under known individuating and identifying borders - what the author calls Closed Individualism - is shown to be incoherent. The demonstration that personal identity is not closed but open points collectively in one of two new directions: either there are no continuously existing, self-identical persons over time in the sense ordinarily understood - the sort of view developed by philosophers as diverse as Buddha, Hume and most recently Derek Parfit, what the author calls Empty Individualism - or else you are everyone, i.e., personal identity is not closed under known individuating and identifying borders, what the author calls Open Individualism. In making his case, the author:
- offers a new explanation both of consciousness and of self-consciousness
- constructs a new theory of Self
- explains psychopathologies (e.g. multiple personality disorder, schizophrenia)
- shows Open Individualism to be the best competing explanation of who we are
- provides the metaphysical foundations for global ethics.
The book is intended for philosophers and the philosophically inclined - physicists, mathematicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, linguists, computer scientists, economists, and communication theorists. It is accessible to graduate students and advanced undergraduates.
Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) is the founder of the subjective interpretation of probability, together with the British philosopher Frank Plumpton Ramsey. His related notion of “exchangeability” revolutionized the statistical methodology. This book (based on a course held in 1979) explains in a language accessible also to non-mathematicians the fundamental tenets and implications of subjectivism, according to which the probability of any well specified fact F refers to the degree of belief actually held by someone, on the ground of her whole knowledge, on the truth of the assertion that F obtains.
The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s.
The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics.
A special section is concerned with constructive mathematics and its foundations. This active branch of mathematics is a direct legacy of Brouwer's intutionism. Today one often views it more abstractly as mathematics based on intuitionistic logic. It can then be regarded as a generalisation of classical mathematics in that it may be given, firstly, the standard set-theoretic interpretation, secondly, algorithmic meaning, and thirdly, nonstandard interpretations in terms of variable sets (sheaves over topological spaces).
The volume will be of interest primarily to researchers and graduate students of philosophy, logic, mathematics and theoretical computer science. The material will be accessible to specialists in these areas and to advanced graduate students in the respective fields.
Nelson Goodman’s disparate writings are often written about only within their own particular discipline, such that the epistemology is discussed in contrast to others’ epistemology, the aesthetics is contrasted with more traditional aesthetics, and the ontology and logic is viewed in contrast to both other contemporary philosophers and to Goodman’s historical predecessors. This book argues that that is not an adequate way to view Goodman. The separate disciplines of ontology, epistemology, and aesthetics should be viewed as sequential steps within his thought, such that each provides the ground rules for the next section and, furthermore, providing the reasons for limitations on the terms available to the subsequent writing(s). This is true not merely because this is the general chronology of his writing, but more importantly because within his metaphysics lies Goodman’s basic nominalist ontology and logic, and it is upon those principles that he builds his epistemology and, furthermore, it is the sum of both the metaphysics and the epistemology, with the nominalist principle as the guiding force, which constructs the aesthetics. At the end of each section of this book, the consequent limitations imposed on his terms and concepts available to him are explicated, such that, by the end of the book, the book delineates the constraints imposed upon the aesthetics by both the metaphysics and the epistemology.
This book will benefit not only the professionals in the field of philosophy, but will also help both graduate and upper level undergraduate students understand Goodman’s disparate writings within their proper context, and hopefully will also encourage them to view philosophical thinking in a less truncated and departmentalized way.
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