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The book's strength is its detailed possible scenarios for a post-Kim Jong Un DPRK. What will the north be like without Kim?
on May 28, 2016
The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia by Andrei Lankov was written in 2013, two years after the Supreme Leader Marshal Kim Jong Un succeeded his late father, the Dear Leader Comrade General Kim Jong Il. Lankov was a Soviet-era exchange student who studied in Pyongyang and his fluency in Korean endeared him to his teachers and gave him access to the North Korean public. This book was unlike other modern accounts of the DPRK which I have read, in that it painted thoroughly dismal portraits of the future of the North after the inevitable downfall of its totalitarian system of government. I have read--and reviewed--quite a lot about the DPRK already, yet no book went as far in its detailed scenarios about the state of the northern half of the Korean peninsula after the Kim regime collapses. Yet before we get to the future of the DPRK, we have to deal with its past and present, and Lankov kept his history confined to the first chapter. The author thankfully did not bore me to sleep with his Korean War history, as I am prone to doze off when I read war stories. Thus I confess a personal prejudice for war histories in general.
Kim Jong Un inherited a country that is worse off that at any time since the Korean War. The DPRK continues to struggle as a nation punished by sanctions and does not want to see another famine. What can it do to feed its population if its economy cannot provide? The answer, surprisingly, seems to be by not reforming its economy:
"Unfortunately for the common North Koreans, the Pyongyang leaders' unwillingness to emulate China has very rational explanations. North Korean leaders stubbornly resist reform not because they are ideological zealots who blindly believe in the prescriptions of the Juche Idea (they do not, and the idea itself is too nebulous to be a guide to a practical policy anyway) nor because they are ignorant of the outside world. They are neither irrational nor ideological--on the contrary, they are rational to the extreme, being, perhaps, the most perfect bunch of Machiavellians currently in operation. The North Korean leaders do not want reforms because they realize that in the specific conditions produced by the division of their country, such reforms are potentially destabilizing and, if judged from the ruling elite's point of view, constitute the surest way of political (and, perhaps, physical) suicide."
Lankov asserts that any reforms would trigger the end of the Kim regime. Once the population tastes reform, it will demand more. The North Korean elite fears an Arab Spring or a Ceaușescu-style purge if reforms are introduced, therefore no one is willing to implement any kind of change out of fear of losing one's elite privileges. Without a new economy, the North is left on its own, and can only get attention by stirring up trouble. And the DPRK has perfected the art of rocking the boat by blackmailing its enemies and even its few allies:
"Indeed, from the North Korean point of view, it did not merely confirm that blackmail works, but rather confirmed that blackmail works wonders. One could hardly find a better confirmation of the efficiency of Pyongyang's usual tactics--first make a crisis, then escalate tensions, and finally extract payments and concessions for the restoration of the status quo."
The North Korean tactic of issuing nuclear threats then reaping the rewards--all on its own terms--has led some diplomats to say enough is enough. They are calling North Korea's bluff, knowing full well that the North will never launch a nuclear missile against the South or any of the ROK's western allies. To do so would be an act of suicide. The strategy of leaving North Korea alone, letting it rant to an empty room, is new, yet has not proven to be entirely effective, as the North has perfected the art of getting whatever it wants regardless of international pressures. It is much like trying to say no to wailing baby:
"The North Korean regime is thus not going to respond to either pressure or rewards, and this is increasingly obvious to the interested parties. There is therefore a great--and growing--temptation to say that North Korea is better to be forgotten and safely left alone. This is the essence of the 'strategic patience' strategy, which has quietly become the mainstream thinking of the US foreign policy establishment after 2009. In essence it says that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea, and maybe even 'reward' it with some monetary and political concessions, as long as North Korea does what the United States wants it to do--that is, starts dismantling its nuclear program. If it doesn't do so, the United States should, as strategic patience promoters insist, ignore North Korea's antics, since North Korea isn't going to be all that harmful anyway. A somewhat similar attitude seems to be dominant among the South Korean Right. These people believe that aid and political concessions make sense only if North Korean leaders agree to policies that are seen as 'rational' by Seoul.
"This reasoning might be attractive, but it seems to be unrealistic. North Korea has not the slightest desire to be left alone. Indeed, they cannot afford to be left alone. In order to compensate for the innate inefficiency of their economy, they need outside help, delivered on their specific conditions. So far, the best way to squeeze this aid has been to appear dangerous, unpredictable, and irrational. Therefore, they will continue to appear thus, attempting to cause more trouble for those countries and international forces from whom they hope to squeeze some resources. The alternative is not really attractive--either to survive on meager and perhaps diminishing returns of their nonfunctioning economy or to become excessively dependent on just one sponsor (China)."
Lankov believes that the North cannot sustain itself and regime collapse is inevitable. When this will all happen is the question. The author supplied multiple scenarios of reunification, none of which involved a peaceful transition and blending of states. The irony is, as the Korean War falls further into history, more and more South Koreans do not want reunification. They see the costs they will have to bear to support their impoverished countrymen and say no thank-you. The mainland Chinese are worried that regime collapse will send a flood of starving unskilled North Koreans across its border, so they aim to keep the status quo. The international reaction is to leave the North Koreans to lie in their own threadbare bed, yet pretty soon the bedposts will rot and the mattress will fall down. What then? No one wants to deal with this inevitability.
Kim Jong Un inherited a country that is worse off that at any time since the Korean War. The DPRK continues to struggle as a nation punished by sanctions and does not want to see another famine. What can it do to feed its population if its economy cannot provide? The answer, surprisingly, seems to be by not reforming its economy:
"Unfortunately for the common North Koreans, the Pyongyang leaders' unwillingness to emulate China has very rational explanations. North Korean leaders stubbornly resist reform not because they are ideological zealots who blindly believe in the prescriptions of the Juche Idea (they do not, and the idea itself is too nebulous to be a guide to a practical policy anyway) nor because they are ignorant of the outside world. They are neither irrational nor ideological--on the contrary, they are rational to the extreme, being, perhaps, the most perfect bunch of Machiavellians currently in operation. The North Korean leaders do not want reforms because they realize that in the specific conditions produced by the division of their country, such reforms are potentially destabilizing and, if judged from the ruling elite's point of view, constitute the surest way of political (and, perhaps, physical) suicide."
Lankov asserts that any reforms would trigger the end of the Kim regime. Once the population tastes reform, it will demand more. The North Korean elite fears an Arab Spring or a Ceaușescu-style purge if reforms are introduced, therefore no one is willing to implement any kind of change out of fear of losing one's elite privileges. Without a new economy, the North is left on its own, and can only get attention by stirring up trouble. And the DPRK has perfected the art of rocking the boat by blackmailing its enemies and even its few allies:
"Indeed, from the North Korean point of view, it did not merely confirm that blackmail works, but rather confirmed that blackmail works wonders. One could hardly find a better confirmation of the efficiency of Pyongyang's usual tactics--first make a crisis, then escalate tensions, and finally extract payments and concessions for the restoration of the status quo."
The North Korean tactic of issuing nuclear threats then reaping the rewards--all on its own terms--has led some diplomats to say enough is enough. They are calling North Korea's bluff, knowing full well that the North will never launch a nuclear missile against the South or any of the ROK's western allies. To do so would be an act of suicide. The strategy of leaving North Korea alone, letting it rant to an empty room, is new, yet has not proven to be entirely effective, as the North has perfected the art of getting whatever it wants regardless of international pressures. It is much like trying to say no to wailing baby:
"The North Korean regime is thus not going to respond to either pressure or rewards, and this is increasingly obvious to the interested parties. There is therefore a great--and growing--temptation to say that North Korea is better to be forgotten and safely left alone. This is the essence of the 'strategic patience' strategy, which has quietly become the mainstream thinking of the US foreign policy establishment after 2009. In essence it says that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea, and maybe even 'reward' it with some monetary and political concessions, as long as North Korea does what the United States wants it to do--that is, starts dismantling its nuclear program. If it doesn't do so, the United States should, as strategic patience promoters insist, ignore North Korea's antics, since North Korea isn't going to be all that harmful anyway. A somewhat similar attitude seems to be dominant among the South Korean Right. These people believe that aid and political concessions make sense only if North Korean leaders agree to policies that are seen as 'rational' by Seoul.
"This reasoning might be attractive, but it seems to be unrealistic. North Korea has not the slightest desire to be left alone. Indeed, they cannot afford to be left alone. In order to compensate for the innate inefficiency of their economy, they need outside help, delivered on their specific conditions. So far, the best way to squeeze this aid has been to appear dangerous, unpredictable, and irrational. Therefore, they will continue to appear thus, attempting to cause more trouble for those countries and international forces from whom they hope to squeeze some resources. The alternative is not really attractive--either to survive on meager and perhaps diminishing returns of their nonfunctioning economy or to become excessively dependent on just one sponsor (China)."
Lankov believes that the North cannot sustain itself and regime collapse is inevitable. When this will all happen is the question. The author supplied multiple scenarios of reunification, none of which involved a peaceful transition and blending of states. The irony is, as the Korean War falls further into history, more and more South Koreans do not want reunification. They see the costs they will have to bear to support their impoverished countrymen and say no thank-you. The mainland Chinese are worried that regime collapse will send a flood of starving unskilled North Koreans across its border, so they aim to keep the status quo. The international reaction is to leave the North Koreans to lie in their own threadbare bed, yet pretty soon the bedposts will rot and the mattress will fall down. What then? No one wants to deal with this inevitability.
on May 16, 2017
I must admit it takes real mental gymnastics to wrap your head around the fact that a soviet national (from Leningrad) wrote a book on north Korea that is decidedly pro-capitalist. But past that, its an excellent overview of the DPRK, lacking only in the very latest of details. Kim Jong Nam went from simply being the bad sheep of the family to occupying a suite 6 feet underground. I suspect it is impossible to produce a true current edition on DPRK. The changes are simply to fast to keep current.
The basic thesis of the book, that N. Korea is not crazy and on the brink of collapse, but rather quite calculating and stable, is depressing but probably correct. My take is we need a few living museums of hard communism left in the world to serve as examples. Thus N. Korea joins Cuba and Venezuela as shining examples of what not to do.
All in all the author does a good job of making the history and current political situation interesting, which is hard. Few history texts are interesting (to me), since the material and probably the author are usually quite dusty.
Read this book go get up to speed on N. Korea. Then, for what it's worth, you will know all about how WWIII started, and be able to tell everyone about it for at least an hour or so.
The basic thesis of the book, that N. Korea is not crazy and on the brink of collapse, but rather quite calculating and stable, is depressing but probably correct. My take is we need a few living museums of hard communism left in the world to serve as examples. Thus N. Korea joins Cuba and Venezuela as shining examples of what not to do.
All in all the author does a good job of making the history and current political situation interesting, which is hard. Few history texts are interesting (to me), since the material and probably the author are usually quite dusty.
Read this book go get up to speed on N. Korea. Then, for what it's worth, you will know all about how WWIII started, and be able to tell everyone about it for at least an hour or so.
on August 24, 2014
. For anyone interested in the history and politics of North Korea, this is an essential read. Andrei Lankov is an expert, in the best sense of that word, on the history, culture, and politics of this rogue nation. He has lived in N. Korea, and has experienced it both first hand and at a distance, as a cultural and political analyst. His prose is clear and convincing, his arguments both analytic and sensitive.
Lankov explains how N. Korea took an increasingly extreme path in the form of Communist dictatorship, even after its allies, Russia and later China, opened up to a modified capitalist economic model. He describes the early economic success of the Kim family regime in the North, and how, over decades, what was viewed as an initial success story has deteriorated into a failed, petty dictatorship. (My observation: The cultural value structure of the Kim family regime is reminiscent of the decadent, pre-Japanese, almost medieval Yi dynasty.)
Lankov documents the N. Korean strategy of "aid-maximizing" through diplomacy and blackmail, and their persistent nuclear threat has served that end. Despite the egalitarian rhetoric of Communism, and of the Kim regime, a form of indentured servitude has become the lot of most North Koreans.
With the growing lack of substantial agricultural and manufacturing productivity, rations stopped being delivered to workers in the mid-1990s. Thus, the Korean population has resorted to individual enterprise and black-market economics, which the regime forcefully suppresses from time to time. Still, these seem to be essential survival strategies for the malnourished population, and officials are complicit. The whole political and social structure seems to be a web-work of lies and deceit. Efforts at currency reform have been disastrous.
At the turn of the millennium (during the two years I was in South Korea), there was a relative thaw in tensions between North and South. An industrial zone near the border of the two countries, funded by the South and employing workers from the North, was one positive outcome of that thaw.
For years, outsiders have hoped that reforms such as those that changed China, might happen in North Korea, as well. In the end, the author seems doubtful that such a relatively peaceful reform would be possible, since those in power stand to lose privilege and power were that to happen.
Lankov admits that "the current system is both unsustainable and unreformable," and he predicts that North Korea will end in a dramatic crisis. He offers several possible scenarios on how that might go down. But, he admits, "[T]he greater the gap between the North and its neighbors--above all South Korea--the greater the potential for a future explosion." And this is what everybody in the West fears, because Seoul is so close to the North.
Still, Lankov sees political unification of the Korean peninsula as a distinct possibility, and he has a chapter in which he provides rational and humane guidelines for a best-case scenario.
I pray that something like his sanity can prevail after the crisis of North Korean collapse. Let us hope that this small peninsula will not become the tinderbox that sets off WWIII.
Lankov explains how N. Korea took an increasingly extreme path in the form of Communist dictatorship, even after its allies, Russia and later China, opened up to a modified capitalist economic model. He describes the early economic success of the Kim family regime in the North, and how, over decades, what was viewed as an initial success story has deteriorated into a failed, petty dictatorship. (My observation: The cultural value structure of the Kim family regime is reminiscent of the decadent, pre-Japanese, almost medieval Yi dynasty.)
Lankov documents the N. Korean strategy of "aid-maximizing" through diplomacy and blackmail, and their persistent nuclear threat has served that end. Despite the egalitarian rhetoric of Communism, and of the Kim regime, a form of indentured servitude has become the lot of most North Koreans.
With the growing lack of substantial agricultural and manufacturing productivity, rations stopped being delivered to workers in the mid-1990s. Thus, the Korean population has resorted to individual enterprise and black-market economics, which the regime forcefully suppresses from time to time. Still, these seem to be essential survival strategies for the malnourished population, and officials are complicit. The whole political and social structure seems to be a web-work of lies and deceit. Efforts at currency reform have been disastrous.
At the turn of the millennium (during the two years I was in South Korea), there was a relative thaw in tensions between North and South. An industrial zone near the border of the two countries, funded by the South and employing workers from the North, was one positive outcome of that thaw.
For years, outsiders have hoped that reforms such as those that changed China, might happen in North Korea, as well. In the end, the author seems doubtful that such a relatively peaceful reform would be possible, since those in power stand to lose privilege and power were that to happen.
Lankov admits that "the current system is both unsustainable and unreformable," and he predicts that North Korea will end in a dramatic crisis. He offers several possible scenarios on how that might go down. But, he admits, "[T]he greater the gap between the North and its neighbors--above all South Korea--the greater the potential for a future explosion." And this is what everybody in the West fears, because Seoul is so close to the North.
Still, Lankov sees political unification of the Korean peninsula as a distinct possibility, and he has a chapter in which he provides rational and humane guidelines for a best-case scenario.
I pray that something like his sanity can prevail after the crisis of North Korean collapse. Let us hope that this small peninsula will not become the tinderbox that sets off WWIII.
on May 24, 2016
I read this book to gain insight into North Korea for an upcoming novel I'm writing. It didn't just inform me about North Korea, it made me sympathize deeply with the North Korean people (and I don't mean it made me a supporter of the Kim's or the terribly inefficient government that has destroyed the freedom of its people) . Andrei Lankov shares expertly from his own experience of what living behind the curtain is like, painting an eye-opening picture as to why the regime operates the way it does and how Western countries can safely help in accelerating its inevitable fall.
It is well worth a read, you won't see North Korea the same afterwards.
It is well worth a read, you won't see North Korea the same afterwards.
on April 25, 2013
I agree with the generally positive comments this book has received here and elsewhere. Anyone looking for an up-to-date and trenchant analysis of North Korea would be very well served by this volume.
My criticism is directed at Oxford University Press for their truly incompetent editing. I don't think there is a single paragraph that does not contain some grammatical error or stylistic howler--subject-verb disagreement, confused tenses, wrong use of articles, garbled syntax, you name it. I'm amazed that a house of OUP's reputation should let a sloppy job like this out its doors. And this isn't just carping grammarianism on my part. The mistakes are so egregious and frequent that they detract from the author's otherwise solid analysis and arguments. The fact that Mr. Lankov is not a native English speaker is not the issue. It was his publisher's job to clean up his prose and make him look better than he does here. In this, the chief responsibility of any publisher to an author appearing under their name, Oxford failed Mr. Lankov miserably.
My criticism is directed at Oxford University Press for their truly incompetent editing. I don't think there is a single paragraph that does not contain some grammatical error or stylistic howler--subject-verb disagreement, confused tenses, wrong use of articles, garbled syntax, you name it. I'm amazed that a house of OUP's reputation should let a sloppy job like this out its doors. And this isn't just carping grammarianism on my part. The mistakes are so egregious and frequent that they detract from the author's otherwise solid analysis and arguments. The fact that Mr. Lankov is not a native English speaker is not the issue. It was his publisher's job to clean up his prose and make him look better than he does here. In this, the chief responsibility of any publisher to an author appearing under their name, Oxford failed Mr. Lankov miserably.
on January 21, 2015
I found this book when thinking about the recent controversy concerning the hacking of Sony Pictures systems, possibly by hackers located in or directed by North Korea. Rather than watch a film which had little appeal to me, The Interview, and which promised to provide only cliches about North Korea at best, I thought I would devote the time and money to finding a book which taught me something about Korean society, the nature of the regime in the north and the prospects for the future. Andrei Lankov's book more than met my expectations in this regard.
My knowledge of Korean history and society was pretty minimal. I knew a little about the Korean war, but from a Western perspective. I know a little about Stalinist societies in Europe, having visited several many years ago, I have followed the reforms and changes in China, Vietnam and Eastern Europe, but North Korea remained something of a mystery. Lankov provides some background on the Japanese invasion of China, the rise of a guerilla movement in Korea in which Kim Il Sung was active, and his ruthless consolidation of his position as leader in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This is done in outline and is not too taxing. If you want more detail here, then Lankov and others have written much more detailed tomes. He goes on to describe the creation of an extremely controlling and oppressive Stalinist regime with an extraordinary degree of control over individuals and families, but also indicates that to some extent the regime delivered on its promises of a stable food supply and some industrial growth, with some external support from Russia and China. But this system was also extremely inefficient and relied upon continued ignorance of the progress being achieved in South Korea from the 1960s onwards.
By the late 1980s the disparity between the two Koreas was massive, and the external support for North Korea began to fall away, with catastrophic results for the North Korea population. Lankov estimates that 500,000 people died, although there are higher estimates, as he acknowledges. Interestingly North Korean society changed through this period, with greater freedom being allowed to farmers and small traders to participate in markets and greater corruption and the rise of criminal businesses selling drugs and fake currency. But the extraordinarily oppressive controls of personal freedom remained largely intact and the suppression of anything resembling political debate, let alone dissent, continued. This system required a bureaucracy, a political force, a network of informers, and a cadre of technical experts, all of whom were rewarded to some extent, although the primary beneficiaries were the Kim family (ie the relatives and descendants of KIm Il Sung) who remain in power.
Lankov argues that it is the maintenance of the power and privilege of this group, against the background of a much richer South Korea, which is the driving force behind many of the actions which capture international headlines - the attacks on South Korea, the testing of missiles, and the negotiations over the nuclear program. The alternative path of economic reform, tried so successfully in China under Deng Xiaoping, is simply not an option for the regime, which would implode or dissolve, Lankov argues, as the full extent of the economic mismanagement historically became clear. One of the strengths of this book is the comparison with various countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Lankov has his own perspective on these events and this adds to the richness of the narrative.
The final section of the book considers scenarios for the medium term, and ways in which the poltical and economic development of North Korea might be assisted by South Korea and the US, and by China, which has become a significant trading partner. Lankov highlights the development of an industrial park and a tourist enclave just north of he DMZ as a very promising development, since it has allowed some greater access by North Koreans to the skills, technology and wage levels of the south, or at least another route by which such ideas might flow to the north. He also argues for much more support for refugees from the North, who tend to struggle in the highly competitive labour market of South Korea.
I learnt a great deal from this book, which is informed by a deep knowledge of and interest in Korean history and sustained personal involvement, first as an exchange student and latterly as an academic researcher with the North. At the same time it would be wrong not to register a few critical comments. Lankov writes in a sprightly prose. This is not turgid or laboured. But it is complex and the presentation of the argument can be a bit schematic in places, with a set of options spelt out one by one.
More substantively it would have been interesting to know more about the way in which China exerts its influence, or the lack thereof. Have the Chinese invested directly and if so to what extent and in what sectors ? What would the Chinese economy stand to lose, if that of North Korea collapsed. Perhaps not that much ? Similarly what kind of political dialogue or negotiation takes place, and how. Lankov remarks that the Chinese view North Korea with amused disdain, for a country which continues to follow a path which China abandoned several decades ago.
And then there is the hacking. Lankov wrote this book several years ago and does not touch on this topic. He argues that the nuclear program continues to have some deterrent effect on the US and others, and that the regime occasionally acts with surprising aggression militarily, knowing that it is likely to get away with such acts, even though in a full scale war it would be rapidly destroyed. Against this background it would seem that hacking into US and other systems would be a powerful tool to use, and or at least threaten to use.
My knowledge of Korean history and society was pretty minimal. I knew a little about the Korean war, but from a Western perspective. I know a little about Stalinist societies in Europe, having visited several many years ago, I have followed the reforms and changes in China, Vietnam and Eastern Europe, but North Korea remained something of a mystery. Lankov provides some background on the Japanese invasion of China, the rise of a guerilla movement in Korea in which Kim Il Sung was active, and his ruthless consolidation of his position as leader in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This is done in outline and is not too taxing. If you want more detail here, then Lankov and others have written much more detailed tomes. He goes on to describe the creation of an extremely controlling and oppressive Stalinist regime with an extraordinary degree of control over individuals and families, but also indicates that to some extent the regime delivered on its promises of a stable food supply and some industrial growth, with some external support from Russia and China. But this system was also extremely inefficient and relied upon continued ignorance of the progress being achieved in South Korea from the 1960s onwards.
By the late 1980s the disparity between the two Koreas was massive, and the external support for North Korea began to fall away, with catastrophic results for the North Korea population. Lankov estimates that 500,000 people died, although there are higher estimates, as he acknowledges. Interestingly North Korean society changed through this period, with greater freedom being allowed to farmers and small traders to participate in markets and greater corruption and the rise of criminal businesses selling drugs and fake currency. But the extraordinarily oppressive controls of personal freedom remained largely intact and the suppression of anything resembling political debate, let alone dissent, continued. This system required a bureaucracy, a political force, a network of informers, and a cadre of technical experts, all of whom were rewarded to some extent, although the primary beneficiaries were the Kim family (ie the relatives and descendants of KIm Il Sung) who remain in power.
Lankov argues that it is the maintenance of the power and privilege of this group, against the background of a much richer South Korea, which is the driving force behind many of the actions which capture international headlines - the attacks on South Korea, the testing of missiles, and the negotiations over the nuclear program. The alternative path of economic reform, tried so successfully in China under Deng Xiaoping, is simply not an option for the regime, which would implode or dissolve, Lankov argues, as the full extent of the economic mismanagement historically became clear. One of the strengths of this book is the comparison with various countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Lankov has his own perspective on these events and this adds to the richness of the narrative.
The final section of the book considers scenarios for the medium term, and ways in which the poltical and economic development of North Korea might be assisted by South Korea and the US, and by China, which has become a significant trading partner. Lankov highlights the development of an industrial park and a tourist enclave just north of he DMZ as a very promising development, since it has allowed some greater access by North Koreans to the skills, technology and wage levels of the south, or at least another route by which such ideas might flow to the north. He also argues for much more support for refugees from the North, who tend to struggle in the highly competitive labour market of South Korea.
I learnt a great deal from this book, which is informed by a deep knowledge of and interest in Korean history and sustained personal involvement, first as an exchange student and latterly as an academic researcher with the North. At the same time it would be wrong not to register a few critical comments. Lankov writes in a sprightly prose. This is not turgid or laboured. But it is complex and the presentation of the argument can be a bit schematic in places, with a set of options spelt out one by one.
More substantively it would have been interesting to know more about the way in which China exerts its influence, or the lack thereof. Have the Chinese invested directly and if so to what extent and in what sectors ? What would the Chinese economy stand to lose, if that of North Korea collapsed. Perhaps not that much ? Similarly what kind of political dialogue or negotiation takes place, and how. Lankov remarks that the Chinese view North Korea with amused disdain, for a country which continues to follow a path which China abandoned several decades ago.
And then there is the hacking. Lankov wrote this book several years ago and does not touch on this topic. He argues that the nuclear program continues to have some deterrent effect on the US and others, and that the regime occasionally acts with surprising aggression militarily, knowing that it is likely to get away with such acts, even though in a full scale war it would be rapidly destroyed. Against this background it would seem that hacking into US and other systems would be a powerful tool to use, and or at least threaten to use.
A RARE PEEK INSIDE THE CRAZY WORLD OF THE REAL LIFE FEARLESS LEADER ANGEL DARLING SWEETHEARTS THAT RULE NORTH KOREA!
on August 24, 2015
I'm pretty sure the information in this book is largely spot on because; most everything I read about North Korea is effectively the same. There are slight variations but in effect the experiences shared by the different are largely the same. That said North Korea is the craziest place on Earth. If I hadn't known North Korea really exists, I'd swear the stories I hear about its government, its rulers and its history are the weird over the top fantasy of a kind found in Barbarella Queen of the Galaxy or (Brazil the campy Orwellian movie not the country)
The books read almost like spy novels because; every aspect of life in North Korea reads like a James Bond thriller without any of the lavish accompaniments. You must learn spy craft just to live in North Korea because anything that does not revolve tightly around the Little Father Angel Darling Sweethearts or whatever the Fearless Leader of North Korea is called today is treason. For all my lite hearted flippant talk about this book it is compelling and sad to hear of so much suffering by just plain common folk in North Korea. Hearing of people starving to death hurts my heart to a point words can explain. Hearing of people so starved that they don't stand because doing so burns to much energy saddens me greatly.
The really terrible thing is in the face of such horrid suffering we in the west are powerless to help North Korea working people because; the government would use whatever it saves to build Atomic bombs. North Korean communism is not the new communism lite like practiced in China and Vietnam. North Korean communism is full on Brutal Stalinist micromanagement personality cult communism that punishes you if you don't clean the portraits of the North Korean fearless leader angel darling sweethearts past and present.
The books read almost like spy novels because; every aspect of life in North Korea reads like a James Bond thriller without any of the lavish accompaniments. You must learn spy craft just to live in North Korea because anything that does not revolve tightly around the Little Father Angel Darling Sweethearts or whatever the Fearless Leader of North Korea is called today is treason. For all my lite hearted flippant talk about this book it is compelling and sad to hear of so much suffering by just plain common folk in North Korea. Hearing of people starving to death hurts my heart to a point words can explain. Hearing of people so starved that they don't stand because doing so burns to much energy saddens me greatly.
The really terrible thing is in the face of such horrid suffering we in the west are powerless to help North Korea working people because; the government would use whatever it saves to build Atomic bombs. North Korean communism is not the new communism lite like practiced in China and Vietnam. North Korean communism is full on Brutal Stalinist micromanagement personality cult communism that punishes you if you don't clean the portraits of the North Korean fearless leader angel darling sweethearts past and present.
on January 16, 2014
"The Real North Korea" departs from the standard points of view on the Hermit Kingdom. Most portrayals of North Korea, at least those read by Americans who look on that country with macabre fascination, paint the leadership as a combination of evil and insane. While the author bluntly explains the horrible oppression and human rights violations in North Korea, he does provide a convincing argument that the leaders' actions are not irrational. What seems like suicidal saber-rattling has actually been key to the regime's survival. While many expect the North Koreans to rebound by adopting Chinese-style reforms, Lankov says that won't happen because the leaders are convinced that increased liberties and greater knowledge about the prosperity of the South would lead quickly to the regime's collapse -- and a subsequent blood bath for the Pyongyang elite. Nevertheless, collapse is inevitable, and Lankov lays out what steps South Korea, China and the United States will have to take to mitigate the calamity that ensues. The worst scenarios and horrific but even the best scenarios leave much to be desired. For example, only the elite will come close to having the job skills and education needed in a capitalist system. Today's oppressed won't get justice; they'll get the shaft. As books written by academics go, this is very readable and insightful. It gave me a new perspective on North Korea, its policies and its prospects.
on January 9, 2014
This book is a great resource for getting the gist of the North Korean situation, but I feel like Lankov unfairly criticizes the Bush Administration and Lee Myong Bak's approach to North Korea. I read Victor Cha's "North Korea: The Impossible State" and I must say that the US has given North Korea unprecedented flexibility in negotiations only to have them rejected on simply absurd claims. While Lankov's analysis regarding the country is good, and I would encourage anyone to read this book, his position on both the "Sunshine Policy" and previous approaches to North Korea seem a bit skewed. My suspicion is that he just hasn't had the experience of negotiating directly with the North Koreans as Victor Cha has. He correctly identifies however that North Korea will ultimately only be changed by North Koreans, and I applaud him for advocating the assistance of defectors who resettle in South Korea.
on January 9, 2016
I've read everything I've been able to get my hands on about the DPRK. Over all, I think this is the best book. Andrei has a wonderfully spare and precise writing style, and he has an unbelievably dry wit as well, to the point that sometimes it's hard to tell whether he is joking. He is not afraid to make moral judgments when it's appropriate.
You will learn a lot if you read this book. You will also savor many beautifully-crafted individual sentences. Can't say both about many NORK books.
You will learn a lot if you read this book. You will also savor many beautifully-crafted individual sentences. Can't say both about many NORK books.
