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39 of 67 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars Another Pleasant EvPsycher with a Shoddy Argument, February 16, 2011
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This review is from: Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind (Hardcover)
Kurzban opens this little volume by recounting his attendance at a workshop on "self-deception" that included such luminaries as Thomas Schelling and Robert Trivers. He found that the august group failed to get a handle on the phenomenon. Kurzban relates that after the meeting he concluded that "the concept of modularity...easily unraveled the Gordian knot of self-deception." (ix) Of course! The whole world believes the human mind is a unified entity with a single center of consciousness dictating consistency from its various parts (the unitary mind model), whereas Evolutionary Psychology has definitively shown that the human mind is actually a beanbag collection of information processing modules, each adapted for a particular fitness-enhancing purpose at some point in our emergence as a species. Self-deception is no problem because there simply is no "self." There are just lots of little interconnected and jostling modules. "The very notion of the `self'", says Kurzban, is "something of a problem, and perhaps quite a bit less useful that one might think... "you"---the part of your brain that experiences the world and feels like you're in "control"---is better thought of as a press secretary than as the president." (22) In other words, there is no one giving orders in the brain, and our conscious selves merely report on and try to justify behavior that is inherently without reason.

Kurzban presents a long list of well-documented psychological phenomena, from optical illusions to preference reversal, showing in each case that the concept of modularity makes sense of the seeming nonsensical. The problem with his argument is that there is more structure to the brain than is suggested by the concept of modularity. In addition the brain exhibits a hierarchical arrangement of modules, with higher-level units controling, coordinating, and synthesizing the lower-level modules in the hierarchy. In particular, there are domain-general brain functions that account for the unitary nature of the brain.

Kurzban is a bright and engaging young researcher who is tragically shooting himself in the foot by his faith in a psychological theory that has no future, and probably never did. When Noam Chomsky proposed his theory of innate predisposition for human language in the 1960's, modularity of mind seemed plausible. But no other autonomous and independent modular structure has been isolated, and Chomsky's theory is now widely rejected by linguists in favor of more general Bayesian developmental models of language acquisition.

I am sure the skeptical reader is asking, what about the fact that accident and stroke can lead an individual to lose incredibly specific mental capacities, such as recognizing faces or forming plurals. These and related phenomena show that the brain has localized information processing structures, but they do not show the absence of overarching coordinating functions in the brain. Moreover, we now know that the structure of the brain is not determined genetically at birth, but rather evolves endogenously with experience over the first several years of life, through which process the number neurons in the brain falls as the number of interconnections increases. The brain is thus a developmental unity. There are certainly regions of the brain that stress specific forms of information processing, but there are so many interconnections among these regions that it is not plausible to think of modules as largely autonomous and self-controlling.

Methodologically, Kurzban shows that the absence of domain-general modules can explain some otherise puzzling aspects of human behavior. The two problems with this methodology are there are other explanations of the same phenomenon that do not deny the existence and synthesizing power of domain-general mental processes.

Perhaps the clearest example of the weakness in Kurzban's reasoning is the story behind the title of the book. If the brain were unitary, he claims, we would have a set of moral principles which we both affirm and obey. But what about the politician who condemns prostitution but is discovered consorting with prostitutes? Clearly this shows the brain is modular, with a "morality module" that forbids consorting with prostitutes and an "erotic module" that promotes the consorting. Kurzban's argument is weak on two grounds. First, Kurzban makes the mistake (here and throughout the book) of treating morality as a set of constraints on behavior, when in fact it generally consists of values we place on behaviors. For instance, I value being honest, so I am willing to sacrifice other valuable things (e.g., money) to preserve my integrity. However, honesty is not an inviolable constraint for me. If conditions are such that I might gain from lying, then I might well lie. This is just a matter of trade-offs (a concept not in Kurzban's lexicon). For trivial example, suppose I send a book to a friend in another country, and I must declare the value on a customs form. The actual value is $11, but if I declare this, my friend will have to go the customs office, a several hour trip, to pay a 25 cent duty, which take officials about a half hour for doing the paperwork. If I declare $10, the book will be delivered to his home, reducing the cost of the transaction both to my friend and the government of his host country. So I lie.

Second, there is absolutely no contradiction between thinking prostitution is immoral and consorting with prostitutes. The flesh is weak, as we all know. Indeed, I might prefer that prostitution be outlawed because only if the cost is sufficiently high will my weak flesh be deterred from consorting. I recall quite vividly condemning smoking while feeding my two-pack a day habit. I was actually grateful for people who criticized my smoking; without these good Samaritans, I probably would not have been able to quit.

A good example of showing that modularity implies behavior without considering whether there are plausible alternative explanations of the same behavior is the case of self-delusion, the example with which Kurzban opens up the book. For instance, a terminal cancer patient may convince himself that if he eats right, prays daily, and fights the disease with optimistic thoughts, he will get well. If the brain is modular and he can shield this thought from evaluation by what we may call a "science" module that would find it wanting, then he may be happy long into his final illness. However, an alternative theory is that there is no such evaluative module, and humans are capable of believing a vast number of things for which there is no proof, even if one has a hypertrophied "science" module. To my way of thinking (following Peirce) judging the truth of assertions is a social, not an individual, process, and the scientific method takes place across, not within, minds.

Kurzban's denial of domain-general brain mechanisms leads him to doubt the existence of a self. But is there really no "self" inside there? Who wrote this book? Who put together a unified, connected argument? Is Robert Kurzban merely a press secretary? I think not.

One of Kurzban's chief arguments is that specialization leads to efficiency (Adam Smith's pin factory?). He example is computer software, which consists of tens of thousands of highly specific pieces of information processing and decision-making. What, however, about the computer itself? Despite its obvious modularity, the digital computer is a highly general, unified entity, each of whose parts contributes in some way to the computer's flexibility. Humans are like computers: we are generalized processors that can be programmed in a myriad of different ways. Here are two aspects of human programmability.

First, Homo sapiens is also Homo ludens---man, the player, to use Huizinga's apt phrase. A young child understands the concept of a game, and understands that one can change the rules, but that the rules apply to all participants. Children can play many diverse games, and adults play even more, in the form of social roles (mother, daughter, professor, church communicant, voter, etc.) among which they switch constantly. Non-human animals play, but only what they are "wired" to play. The success of Homo sapiens lies largely in the ability of its members to adapt the rules of the game in society to changing survival needs. These domain-general capacities are the antithesis of modularity.

Second, human internalize moral values from their society, leading them to behave in highly diversified ways. Moral values are not localized to specific modules. They pervade our thinking and affect all our behaviors, even when we behave in ways of which we disapprove.

This of course does not mean that we don't have distinct parts of the brain that are responsible for fulfilling distinct needs. We obviously do. Part of my brain is monitoring my blood sugar and telling how much I want food at the moment. Another part is monitoring my temperature, and yet another my sexual cravings. Each of these parts can be more or less insistent depending on my current state of being and my current environment. I have no problem calling these "modules," so long as we recognize that evolutionary pressures will tend strongly to bring such modules into a coherent whole. This Kurzban appears not to understand.

For example, suppose I have three modules, one for temperature, one for hunger, and one for light (dark is better because I can avoid predators in the dark). Suppose when I am in a certain state, I have three choices, A, B, and C, each of which has a certain temperature, lighting, and available food. Suppose my temperature model has preference ordering ACB (A preferred to C and C preferred to B), while my light module has ordering BAC and my hunger module has ordering CBA. If all three are weighted equally in my choosing among the three options, I prefer B to A because two of my options prefer B to A; I prefer A to C and I prefer C to B. Thus I have classically intransitive preferences: A > B > C > A. However, suppose in this state A is in fact the most fitness enhancing, and a mutant comes along that has reduced weight on the CBA module and increased weight on the other two. Such a mutant would be more fit than its parents, and would pass the mutation onto its offspring. In the long run, the intransitivity would disappear. Darwinian evolution leads "modules" to work with, not against, each other.

Does this mean I am denying the laboratory evidence concerning the error-proneness of human decision-making? Of course not. I am denying that this evidence supports radical notions of the insufficiency of human reasoning power. Let me give an analogy. There are many optical illusions. Does the fact that there are optical illusions mean that we are radically deficient in see correctly? Of course not. The human brain is imperfect and it makes systematic mistakes. It is important to understand and deal with the frailty of human decision-making. Just calling everything modular and denying the efficacy of the self does not get us far.
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Showing 1-10 of 10 posts in this discussion
Initial post: Feb 18, 2011 5:34:02 AM PST
Last edited by the author on Feb 22, 2011 7:15:53 AM PST
R. Kurzban says:
Even those who didn't know that Gintis is a rabid opponent of evolutionary psychology will detect his partisanship in the tone here, and I hope that readers will understand his remarks in this context. I won't address all his errors (another book would be needed), but I would like to correct just a few of the most glaring misrepresentations here.

Gintis says that the brain is not "determined genetically at birth," as if I said that was. I didn't, nor do I believe that it is.

Gintis says that the brain "is a developmental entity," as though I disagree. To the extent I understand what this might mean, I don't disagree, and I obviously think that the brain develops.

Gintis writes that "the ability... to adapt the rules of the game" is "the antithesis of modularity," but this opposition confuses modularity as I (and others) use the term (specialized) with the incorrect meaning he wants to pin on the term modularity (inflexible).

Related, Gintis writes that "human (sic) internalize moral values from their society, leading them to behave in highly diversified ways," again writing as if he is correcting me, but I did not write anything to suggest otherwise (though I'm not sure what he means by "internalize").

These remarks are, again, intended only to clean up a few of the larger errors rather than all of them.

2/22/11 - Note: Today I removed some material from my first version of this comment, and I think it appropriate to explain. Gintis claims that "trade-offs" is not a concept not in my lexicon. Because the term appears a dozen or so times in the book, I suggested that his claim was an intentional misrepresentation on his part. Given his remarks below, I will accept that his error was due to lack of knowledge rather than intent to mislead, and that he simply didn't read the material in the book in which I discussed tradeoffs (in chapters 2, 5, 6, and 8). This is consistent with the fact that his review attributes so many views to me that I do not hold (see above). (For my thoughts on why people make errors of this type, see the section on being "strategically wrong" in the book.)

On his point below about engaging his arguments, I won't do that here because, first, I think Amazon reviews are for evaluating books, not for settling academic disputes, and, second, again, his critiques are largely aimed at positions I also reject, including genetic determinism, cognitive inflexibility, spatial modularity, and so on.

To his credit, Gintis has admitted the unfairness of his review, and revised his evaluation a touch upward. I hope that if and when he finds the time to read the book in its entirety, he will be even more favorably disposed towards it.

- Rob Kurzban

In reply to an earlier post on Feb 18, 2011 6:06:03 AM PST
I am an evolutionary psychologist, not a "rabid opponent" of evolutionary psychology. Most evolutionary psychologists are skeptical of modularity. Only the Cosmides-Tooby branch is a strong proponent of modularity.

Honesty is not an involable constraint for anyone, not just me.

I deeply resent being called "rabid" and "dishonest." I made not ad hominem remarks in my review, and I don't appreciate the ad hominems in the rejoinder. I urge you to rephrase your remarks. They do not do your argument justice.

My remark about trade-offs was snide and inappropriate. I will retract it.

It would not take a book to deal with my substantive comments. Why don't you just try to deal with my interpretation of what you call "hypocracy"? I will rewrite it to clarity. I do seek light, not heat.

In reply to an earlier post on Feb 18, 2011 6:15:09 AM PST
I revised my review after your comments. Rereading it, I realized that in a few places I was unfair, so I changed them.

In reply to an earlier post on Feb 19, 2011 3:33:22 PM PST
Last edited by the author on Feb 19, 2011 3:35:29 PM PST
I must admit that I am disappointed by Gintis' confused review. He repeatedly contradicts himself and gets tied up in knots over "modularity" verbiage.

First, Ginits says that "there is no evidence that the brain is modular," then he admits it is modular by reference to specific cognitive deficits after brain damage, specific modules to assess body states (temperature, etc.), and modules that process visual information to recognize faces.

He then conflates ultimate and proximate explanations of modularity when he complains that Kurzban doesn't refer to specific brains structures that correlate with presumed psychological modules. This is rather like Darwin's contemporaries rejecting the Darwin's theory of evolution because he could not specify actual proximate mechanisms of inheritance (what we now call genes). Darwin himself suggested that the brain must be modular with his famous quote: "Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation." Each mental power = an evolved psychological adaptation, or "module."

Gintis takes an embarrassing u-turn with his computer analogy. "Despite its obvious modularity, the digital computer is a highly general, unified entity, each of whose parts contributes in some way to the computer's flexibility. Humans are like computers: we are generalized processors that can be programmed in a myriad of different ways." Huh? This statement is self-contradictory. Human brains are modular (like computer hardware and software), but, when the modules work together as programmed, they magically transform into non-modular general purpose systems?

With his hypothetical example of three competing modules (temperature, hunger, and light) Gintis ignores the possibility of modules within modules, of hierarchical modules, with "higher" integrating modules evaluating the input of competing "subordinate" ones.

Can you imagine a non-modular body? A body without organs, a "general purpose physiology machine" with a general purpose biochemistry that can handle any physical challenge? I can't. The possibility of a general purpose brain, without multiple modules that interact hierarchically, is equally implausible.

Although I am generally impressed with Gintis' reviews, and with his theories about strong reciprocity and altruistic punishment, he has fumbled this review.

In reply to an earlier post on Feb 19, 2011 4:39:03 PM PST
Last edited by the author on Feb 19, 2011 4:39:33 PM PST
I welcome criticism of my review. I will think about all of your points. Here are some comments.

MM: First, Gintis says that "there is no evidence that the brain is modular," then he admits it is modular by reference to specific cognitive deficits after brain damage, specific modules to assess body states (temperature, etc.), and modules that process visual information to recognize faces.
HG: The fact that parts of the brain are specialized for specific tasks is absolutely accepted by all parties. Visual processing, aural processing, motor control, proprioceptive information processing, and a host of other tasks are specialized in particular areas of the brain. When these areas are destroyed, other parts of the brain can take over some, but not all, of the lost functionality. Since this is well-known by all, and the EvPsychers argue that their modularity thesis goes against received wisdom, they must mean something else by "modularity." What they apparently mean is that there are many modules, each of which is an adaptation for a particular function. This is radically false, as I tried to argue. There are overarching domain-general properties of the human brain that integrate the functioning of the parts. We are genetically predisposed to have these domain-general integrative mental powers, but they are physiologically instatiated in the first few years of life, as stressed by evo-devo developmental psychology.

MM: He then conflates ultimate and proximate explanations of modularity when he complains that Kurzban doesn't refer to specific brains structures that correlate with presumed psychological modules. This is rather like Darwin's contemporaries rejecting the Darwin's theory of evolution because he could not specify actual proximate mechanisms of inheritance (what we now call genes).
HG: You are unfair in say I "conflate," and the analogy with Darwin is quite spurious. I say there are no proximate modules of the type EvPsycher theorize about. I am not questioning the mechanisms leading from ultimate to proximate---I know what those mechanism are; they are described in evolutionary biology. I say the proximate isn't there.

MM: Darwin himself suggested that the brain must be modular with his famous quote: "Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation." Each mental power = an evolved psychological adaptation, or "module."
MM: More smoke and mirrors. Who cares what Darwin said? Moreover, his statement is eminently correct, but applies to the evolution of the brain across species, not with a species.

MM: Gintis takes an embarrassing u-turn with his computer analogy. "Despite its obvious modularity, the digital computer is a highly general, unified entity, each of whose parts contributes in some way to the computer's flexibility. Humans are like computers: we are generalized processors that can be programmed in a myriad of different ways." Huh? This statement is self-contradictory. Human brains are modular (like computer hardware and software), but, when the modules work together as programmed, they magically transform into non-modular general purpose systems?
HG: Yes, that is correct. When there are powerful domain-general integrative powers within a complex system, evolutionary adaptations, or human engineering, can turn the system into a unified whole.

MM: With his hypothetical example of three competing modules (temperature, hunger, and light) Gintis ignores the possibility of modules within modules, of hierarchical modules, with "higher" integrating modules evaluating the input of competing "subordinate" ones.
HG: What is your point here? Please elucidate.

MM: Can you imagine a non-modular body? A body without organs, a "general purpose physiology machine" with a general purpose biochemistry that can handle any physical challenge? I can't. The possibility of a general purpose brain, without multiple modules that interact hierarchically, is equally implausible.
HG: As I said, everyone agrees that there is a division of labor in the brain. It is the assertion that there are no powerful domain-general synthesizing agents in the brain that characterizes the "modular brain" EvPsychers (Kurzban's "there is no self", or "the self is a press secretary, not a President").
MM:Although I am generally impressed with Gintis' reviews, and with his theories about strong reciprocity and altruistic punishment, he has fumbled this review.
HG: Thanks for the kind words, and for careful effort to correct the weaknesses in my argument. Recall my main points about Kurzban's analysis. First, the phenomena he explains using a module model can be explained by many other models. Second, Kurzban denies domain generality in the brain (there is no self...). The hypocrisy example is perhaps the most egregious, but his analysis of self-delusion is about as shoddy.

I thought about Kurzban's two ad hominems, that I am dishonest and I am a rabid opponent of evolutionary psychology. I hope he will withdraw the first. I am very honest in my writings on science and politics. As for the second, I am a rabid opponent of models of mind that (a) do not recognize the great success of the rational actor model; and (b) depict human decision-making as irrational and illogical. Most of evolutionary psychology recognizes the brain as an adaptedd organ with powerful domain-general synthesizing capabilities. I am an indefatigable opponent of faddish theories that deny these truths.

In reply to an earlier post on Feb 19, 2011 10:56:17 PM PST
Last edited by the author on Feb 19, 2011 11:03:56 PM PST
As Don Symons once wrote, "if we are all Darwinians, what's the fuss about?"

I believe your core argument is that there are "powerful domain-general synthesizing agents in the brain."

I'm not sure that domain-specific folks would disagree with the fundamental idea. They would just likely call the "synthesizing agents" meta-modules that evaluate the input from other modules. That is what I mean by a hierarchy of modules. Neurological processing of visual information is perhaps a good example. There are many levels of visual neurological submodules, starting with basic visual scene detectors (Edge detectors, Motion detectors) to intermediate (Alive or dead? Human or non-human? A face?), to integrative (A face that I know? Yes. Oh, It's my grandmother!). (Let me conveniently side-step the binding problem for now.)

But I think we can all agree that there is no magical domain general agent that can conclude "It's my grandmother!" without the input from sub-modules. And that even higher order modules must have some structure and operate by certain rules with some regularity given typical gene-environment developmental trajectories (evo-devo).

If what some folks label "domain general" is the same thing as what other folks label a higher order "meta-module" then the disagreement is mostly semantic. And, if some folks are interested in studying the operation of "lower level" modules ("why is sugar sweet?"), while others are more interested in the "higher level" ones ("why is it important to be able to recognize the faces of kin?), then... what's the fuss about?

In reply to an earlier post on Feb 19, 2011 11:15:08 PM PST
Well, Michael, I think we are getting to an important part of the problem. You are correct in concluding that "your core argument is that there are powerful domain-general synthesizing agents in the brain."

MM:I'm not sure that domain-specific folks would disagree with the fundamental idea. They would just likely call the "synthesizing agents" meta-modules that evaluate the input from other modules. That is what I mean by a hierarchy of modules.
HG: Well, I don't much care what you call it. Module is probably violating the spirit of "domain-general," and the idea of a hierarchy of modules is your idea, not the EvPsychers. It seems to me to violate the idea of a module to say that a higher-level module can control a set of lower-level modules, but I have no quarrel with that, if you are intent on conserving the ubiquity of module concept.
However, I thing you are being charitable. The idea that "there is no self" and what appears to be a "president" is really a "press secretary" does not seem to be consonant with your interpretation.

MM:But I think we can all agree that there is no magical domain general agent that can conclude "It's my grandmother!" without the input from sub-modules. However, even that higher order module must have some structure itself and operate by certain rules with some regularity given typical gene-environment developmental trajectories (evo-devo).
HG: I believe we can agree to this, but I reserve the possibility that there are domain-general agents (not magical, probably).

MM: If what some folks label "domain general" is the same thing as what other folks label a higher order "meta-module" then the disagreement is mostly semantic. And, if some folks are interested in studying the operation of "lower level" modules, while others are more interested in the "higher level" ones, then... what is the fuss about?
HG: The difference is whether it is plausible to model human behavior as though there is a "self" in many important situations. I believe there is. That is what I do for a living, and I try to defend my idea when people say "there is no self" and reject the work that uses a self (e.g., the rational actor model, socialization theory, morality as a cogent force in organizing people's lives, etc.).
Perhaps this is rank self-justification, but I feel ecumenical because I accept the critical importance of the experimental work on human decision-making (it figures prominently in every book I have written over the past twelve years), while the "people are irrational fitness maximizers" psychologists (including the EvPsychers) are hostile to all work that treats people as rational decision-makers with other-regarding and moral preferences.
To repeat: the fact that there are optical illusions does not imply that people generally cannot visualize reality appropriately. Jet pilots and 3-point basketball shooters give the lie to any such notion. Similarly, the fact that people don't behave according to the simple rational actor model in the laboratory is critically important, and bids that we considerably revise this model (I give some suggestions to this end in my book The Bounds of Reason), but not that we reject the whole paradigm.
Thanks for the useful remarks, and for your worthy attempt to adjudicate this important issue, Michael.

In reply to an earlier post on Feb 19, 2011 11:28:14 PM PST
Herbert, thank you for the discussion. Interesting perspectives... and, time will tell.

In reply to an earlier post on Apr 18, 2011 11:09:36 PM PDT
Last edited by the author on Apr 18, 2011 11:10:50 PM PDT
Brian says:
I think a good book of this type should get you thinking and present a good model of why we are the way we are as humans.

I am purchasing this book tonight and I am glad that this dialog exists between you both as it only enhances my interest in the book. This thread was the thing that put me over the top over a few other books I was considering loading on my kindle for something interesting to read on an up and coming trip.

I have had interest in different parts of the mind operating at different levels after reading Aristotle's when I was in high school as he describes these tensions in the Phaedrus, using an example of a charioteer and his two horses. Several years ago the concept was presented with a new twist in The Happiness Hypothesis By Jonathan Haidt using an elephant.

I look forward to the book expanding on the concept of different systems of the brain and how they interact to make us who we are. I plan to refer back to this thread after spending some time with the book for more insight.

BTW Great Title! Thank you for having text to speech enabled on the kindle version so a can stay engaged with the book while walking in the airport etc.

Posted on Feb 6, 2012 5:54:04 PM PST
This turned out to be a very helpful conversation. Thanks very much to Herbert, Robert, and Michael for their willingness to discuss the important points here. The conversation made this review particuarly informative. Reading this book I also struggled with the implication that seems to pervade throughout that there can be no unifying mechanisms to explain our perception of "self" as more than an illusion, even though I have a hard time seeing why the "modular" architectural principles espoused should make such mechanisms impossible or even improbable. The conversation here helped me see that the question is more nuanced that it first appears. Thanks again.
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